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I. INTRODUCTION 
The impact of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases (“GHG”s) on the Earth’s climate may well be the most 
profound environmental problem that the civilized world has ever 
encountered.  Since the United States has until quite recently been the largest 
emitter of greenhouse gases, its efforts to ameliorate climate disruption by 
reducing those emissions have been of considerable interest to its citizens 
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and the rest of the world’s inhabitants.1  Yet, it has done very little to reduce 
GHG emissions until very recently, and even those initial steps have been 
tiny in comparison to what reputable scientists say is needed to mitigate 
climate change.  In the years since climate disruption became a serious 
political issue in the late 1980s, supporters of a federal program to reduce 
GHG emissions have made five serious attempts to move legislation through 
Congress—the Clinton Administration’s British Thermal Unit (“BTU”) tax 
in the 103rd Congress, Senator Jim Jeffords’ four-pollutant Bill in the 107th 
Congress, the Lieberman-Warner Bill in the 110th Congress, and the 
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman-Graham Bills in the 111th 
Congress.2  All five of these efforts failed.3 
This article will examine these five major legislative initiatives with 
an eye toward extracting lessons for future efforts to enact major 
environmental legislation.  While there are many reasons for Congress’ 
failure to enact climate disruption legislation, including concerns about the 
underlying science and the efficacy of proceeding ahead in the absence of 
commitments from other massive GHG emitters like China and India,4 I will 
argue that one powerful explanation lies in a thirty-five-year war against 
government regulation waged by the business community, several prominent 
conservative foundations, and the institutions that they created and 
nourished.  I will show how these institutions played a prominent role in 
defeating climate disruption legislation, even when the business 
community’s solid opposition to climate disruption appeared to be dissolving 
as some companies accepted the reality of climate disruption and amended 
                                            
1. Anup Shah, Climate Change and Global Warming Introduction, GLOBAL 
ISSUES (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.globalissues.org/article/233/climate-change-and-global-
warming-introduction. 
2. See infra Part III. 
3. Stephen Power, Senate Halts Effort to Cap Emissions—Democrats Forgo 
Centerpiece of President Obama’s Energy Plan, As Cap-and-Trade Fails to Lure Broad 
Poiltical Support, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2010, at A3 [hereinafter Power, Senate Halts Effort to 
Cap Emissions]; Death of Energy Tax Makes Carbon Levy, Other Environmental Taxes Less 
Likely, UTIL. ENV’T REP., Aug. 6, 1993, at 12, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com; Eric 
Pooley, Why the Climate Bill Failed, TIME (June 9, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,1812836,00.html; S. 556 (107th):  Clean Power Act of 2002:  Overview, 
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/s556 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); 
111th Congress Climate Change Legislation, CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, 
http://www.c2es.org/federal/congress/111 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
4. See James Parker-Flynn, The Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Climate 
Science, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 11098, 11118 (2013); Juliet Eilperin & David A. Fahrenthold, 
Missteps Weigh on Agenda for Climate; Academic Breaches, Flaws in Seminal Report Feed 
Doubts on Warming, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2010, at A1; David Bennett, Cap and Trade—
Tough Questions, DELTA FARM PRESS (July 30, 2009), http://deltafarmpress.com/print/
management/cap-and-trade-tough-questions. 
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their business models accordingly, while others saw opportunities to profit or 
gain competitive advantage from such legislation.5 
My thesis is that the institutions that trade associations and 
conservative funders created and continue to create have by-and-large 
remained true to a laissez faire minimalist prescription for the nation’s 
economy, and they are therefore unalterably opposed to legislation that 
would subject greenhouse gas emitters to government-imposed controls, 
even when such controls might serve the economic interests of a substantial 
number of businesses.  This adamant opposition, which has in turn 
influenced members of Congress from both political parties, has effectively 
forestalled climate disruption legislation.  I will further argue that the 
presence of these powerful negative voices in the legislative debates proved 
to be of great strategic value to companies that preferred that Congress not 
enact any legislation, but wanted a place at the table when Congress was 
shaping the bills that would greatly affect their interests if they became law.  
Hence, the fractures in the business community are not likely to affect the 
vitality of these institutions in the foreseeable future. 
Part II of this article will briefly describe the Laissez-Faire Revival 
that I document in my book—Freedom to Harm—by highlighting the 
institutions that the business community and conservative funders created to 
resist progressive governmental initiatives like climate disruption 
legislation.6  Part III will describe the five attempts to enact climate 
disruption legislation and detail the role those institutions played in defeating 
each of those initiatives.  Part IV will explore some of the lessons that we 
can learn from these failed attempts.  The article reaches the rather 
discouraging conclusion that strong climate disruption legislation is not 
likely to emerge from a deeply divided Congress that reflects the deep 
divisions in the current political culture over the proper role of government 
in today’s economy. 
II. THE LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL 
The Laissez Faire Revival began in the late 1970s as a reaction 
against the progressive legislation that Congress enacted during the late 
1960s and early 1970s to protect consumers, workers, and the environment 
                                            
5. See Reena Jana, The Business Benefits of Going Green, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (June 22, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-06-22/the-
business-benefits-of-going-greenbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-
advice. 
6. THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE 
LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL 6 (2013). 
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from risky products and business practices.7  Several wealthy conservative 
benefactors spent millions of dollars to create an idea infrastructure 
consisting of think tanks and free enterprise centers in universities and law 
schools.8  Financed largely through conservative foundations and corporate 
contributions, this idea infrastructure conducted an air war against federal 
regulation in books, scholarly journals, magazines, white papers, internet 
blogs, op-ed columns, media interviews, and talk shows.9  Three think tanks 
that played prominent roles in the climate disruption battles were the 
Heritage Foundation, the Competitive Enterprise Institute (“CEI”), and the 
George C. Marshall Institute.10 
The business community also created an influence infrastructure to 
conduct the ground war against regulation in the regulatory agencies and 
Congress.11  The most visible of the ground troops during the climate wars 
were the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (“CoC”) and the National Association 
of Manufacturers (“NAM”).12  Less visible, but still highly influential were 
the so-called astroturf grassroots organizations that trade associations and 
conservative funders created to run advertising campaigns in the districts of 
swing members of Congress, sponsor local rallies, and generate phone calls, 
letters, and emails to members of Congress.13  Some of these organizations, 
like the American Energy Alliance (“AEA”), Citizens for a Sound Economy 
(“CSE”), and Americans for Prosperity, were permanent institutions that 
fought in many wars.14  Others were created on an ad hoc basis by public 
relations firms working for companies and trade associations to conduct 
focused campaigns against particular legislative initiatives.15  Another 
critical component of the influence infrastructure was an extremely effective 
media echo chamber for influencing the content of news and political 
commentary at both the national and local levels.16  Two highly influential 
                                            
7. Id. at 5. 
8. Id. at 40. 
9. See id. at 41–56. 
10. Id. at 247; Parker-Flynn, supra note 4, at 11100. 
11. MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 57. 
12. Id. at 60. 
13. Id. at 58–59. 
14. See id. at 59; Robert Parry, What Wouldn’t Bob Do for Koch Oil?, 
NATION, Aug. 26–Sept. 2, 1996, at 11, 13–14; Peter H. Stone, Grass-Roots Goliath, NAT’L J., 
July 13, 1996, at 1529, 1530.  “Established in 1984 by George Mason University economics 
professor Richard Fink with funding from the David H. Koch Foundation,” CSE was a 
sophisticated Astroturf grassroots operation committed to “‘lower taxes, less spending, less 
regulation, and free trade.’”  MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 58; Stone, supra note 14, at 1530. 
15. MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 33. 
16. See KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA, ECHO CHAMBER: 
RUSH LIMBAUGH AND THE CONSERVATIVE MEDIA ESTABLISHMENT 20 (2008); JOHN 
MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT NATION: CONSERVATIVE POWER IN 
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pro-business media outlets were Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation and 
David Smith’s Sinclair Broadcast Group, both of which hosted 
commentators, like Rush Limbaugh and Steve Milloy, who preached a 
populist-flavored laissez faire minimalist message to millions of viewers and 
listeners and provided ready access to conservative think tank scholars.17 
With strong idea and influence infrastructures in place, the business 
community launched three powerful assaults on the protective governmental 
infrastructure that Congress established during the Progressive Era, New 
Deal Era, and Public Interest Eras.18  Those assaults have thus far failed to 
achieve their fundamental goal of repealing the landmark environmental and 
consumer protection statutes of the 1970s, but the business community’s idea 
infrastructure has been remarkably successful in shaping public attitudes 
toward government regulation in society.19  After a 35-year barrage of anti-
regulation rhetoric, many Americans have lost faith in the capacity of 
government to protect it from the vicissitudes of the marketplace. 
The business community has never been monolithic in its opposition 
to federal regulation.20  Pollution control technology vendors, for example, 
have not always been strong supporters of the CoC’s fierce attacks on 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulations.21  Indeed, the fact 
that the bedrock regulatory statutes have survived may, in part, be 
attributable to an understanding on the part of influential members of the 
business community that the appearance of a protective governmental 
infrastructure is necessary to maintain the public’s perception that it is not 
wholly at the mercy of unconstrained economic forces, and that perception, 
in turn, is necessary to maintain a stable economic structure within which 
businesses can thrive.22  During the past few years, there has been a highly 
visible split in the business community on the issue of global warming that 
                                                                                                       
AMERICA 162 (2004); Patricia J. Williams, The Disquieted American, NATION, May 26, 2003, 
at 9.  Compare Distorting Climate Change Findings on KCOL, James Guest Said Gore’s 
“Global Warming Crusade Is a Lot Like Eugenics Was in the ‘20s and ‘30s,” MEDIA 
MATTERS FOR AM. (Oct. 24, 2007, 5:02 PM), http://www.mediamatters.org/research/2007/10/
24/distorting-climate-change-findings-on-kcol-jame/141487, with Company Profile, SINCLAIR 
BROADCAST GROUP, http://www.sbgi.net/about/profile.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
17. DAVID BROCK, THE REPUBLICAN NOISE MACHINE: RIGHT-WING MEDIA 
AND HOW IT CORRUPTS DEMOCRACY 171 (2004); JAMIESON & CAPPELLA, supra note 16, at 46; 
MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 16, at 162; Distorting Climate Change Findings 
on KCOL, James Guest Said Gore’s “Global Warming Crusade Is a Lot Like Eugenics Was in 
the ‘20s and ‘30s,” supra note 16. 
18. MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 6, 60–61. 
19. See id. at 61. 
20. See id. at 39–40, 61. 
21. See Elizabeth Williamson, Climate Issues Divide U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, Big Members, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2008, at A6. 
22. See MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
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goes deeper than the fraying at the edges that might be expected in any large 
organization putatively devoted to a single cause.23  The following 
description of the battles over climate change legislation will highlight these 
divisions and evaluate their significance. 
III. THE ASSAULTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION 
Climate disruption became a salient public policy issue in the mid-
1980s as scientists verified the reality of human activity-induced global 
warming and called for increased energy efficiency to reduce GHG 
emissions.24  During his 1988 campaign to be the nation’s first environmental 
president, candidate George H.W. Bush promised to take action to address 
global warming.25  Soon after his inauguration, the EPA delivered a report to 
Congress proposing bold action, including fees on coal, oil, and natural gas 
to discourage future use of those fossil fuels in producing electricity.26  A 
panel of experts assembled by the National Academies of Sciences urged the 
federal government to take concrete steps to reduce GHG emissions, 
including raising energy taxes and enacting mandatory efficiency 
standards.27 
The business community responded to these developments with a 
coordinated campaign to sew doubt in the minds of policymakers and the 
public about the scientific basis of global warming predictions.28  Relying 
heavily on think-tanks and a small group of mostly industry-funded scientists 
in academia, the electric utility and manufacturing industries sponsored an 
effective public relations campaign to persuade Congress not to enact 
legislation requiring mandatory GHG reductions.29  The Global Climate 
                                            
23. Industry Fractures on Climate Policy, ELECTRICITY J., Dec. 2009, at 1, 1, 
5–6. 
24. See Erik Eckholm, New Predictions See Rise in CO2 Transforming Earth, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1984, at C1; Philip Shabecoff, Major ‘Greenhouse’ Impact Is 
Unavoidable, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1988, at C1 [hereinafter Shabecoff, Major 
‘Greenhouse’ Impact Is Unavoidable, Experts Say]. 
25. MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 108. 
26. Philip Shabecoff, E.P.A. Proposes Rules to Curb Warming, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 1989, at C7. 
27. Rudy Abramson, Prompt Action to Curb Global Warming Urged 
Environment:  Science Panel Says U.S. Could Cut ‘Greenhouse’ Pollution 40% with Little 
Economic Cost, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, at 1. 
28. ROSS GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON: THE CLIMATE CRISIS; THE COVER-UP; 
THE PRESCRIPTION 9, 19, 31 (1998); SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, TRUST US, WE’RE 
EXPERTS!  HOW INDUSTRY MANIPULATES SCIENCE AND GAMBLES WITH YOUR FUTURE 272 
(2001). 
29. GELBSPAN, supra note 28, at 9, 19, 31; RAMPTON & STAUBER, supra note 
28, at 270. 
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Coalition (“GCC”) was created in 1989, comprising of the CoC, the NAM, 
and the auto and energy industries to lobby against climate change 
legislation.30  In 1991, the National Coal Association (“NCA”), the Western 
Fuels Association, the Edison Electric Institute (“EEI”), and trade 
associations for the coal, oil and gas, and electric utility industries, created a 
group called the Information Council on the Environment (“ICE”) which 
“launched a[n] . . . advertising and public relations [effort] to . . . ‘reposition 
global warming as theory—not fact.’”31  The public relations firm it hired 
arranged for the sympathetic scientists on its advisory board to appear in 
broadcast appearances, op-ed pages, and newspaper interviews.32  Faced with 
this strong opposition from the business community, the Bush 
Administration did not seriously attempt to fulfill the president’s campaign 
promise.33 
Toward the end of the Bush Administration, however, a thin fracture 
line began to develop in the business community’s opposition to climate 
disruption regulation as the American Gas Association (“AGA”)—a trade 
association of natural gas producers and distributors—joined the Solar 
Energy Industries Association in sponsoring a study concluding that the 
United States could reduce GHG emissions and increase employment by 
moving rapidly to natural gas-fired power plants, renewable energy, and 
high-efficiency technologies.34 
A. The BTU Tax in the 103rd Congress 
The Clinton Administration hit the ground running with a proposal 
for a tax on energy consumption as part of the Administration’s broader 
legislative effort to balance the federal budget and stimulate the economy.35  
During the first two weeks of January 1993, transition officials debated 
whether the tax should be on the carbon content of all fuels—a carbon tax— 
or the heating value of all fuels—a BTU tax.36  The BTU tax offered a 
weaker incentive to move toward renewable energy than a carbon tax, which 
would not have affected dams, solar energy generators, or nuclear power 
                                            
30. RAMPTON & STAUBER, supra note 28, at 270; Margaret E. Kriz, Warm-
Button Issue, NAT’L J., Feb. 8, 1992, at 319, 322 (1992) [hereinafter Kriz, Warm-Button 
Issue]. 
31. RAMPTON & STAUBER, supra note 28, at 272. 
32. Id. at 272–73. 
33. Kriz, Warm-Button Issue, supra note 30, at 319, 320. 
34. Margaret E. Kriz, The New Eco-nomics, NAT’L J., May 30, 1992. 
35. Gas a Winner in Tax Debate, PLATTS INT’L GAS REP., Feb. 5, 1993, 
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
36. David Hage & Sara Collins, Pointing to Tax Increases, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Feb. 8, 1993, at 46; Gas a Winner in Tax Debate, supra note 35. 
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plants.37  Environmental groups therefore favored the carbon tax.38  The coal 
industry and coal-burning utility companies, however, strongly opposed the 
carbon tax, arguing that it would result in substantial price increases for coal 
compared to natural gas and sources of energy that did not burn fossil fuels.39  
Both energy taxes were more attractive to the incoming administration than 
an addition to the federal gasoline tax, which would have been immediately 
noticeable to consumers.40  Since the Democratic Party controlled the White 
House and both houses during the 103rd Congress, supporters of an energy 
tax were optimistic.41 
Both the energy industry and industries that were large consumers of 
energy were united in their opposition to any new energy taxes.42  The EEI, 
the primary trade association for the electric utility industry, prepared a set of 
economic analyses of several variations of energy taxes and presented them 
to members of the transition team and incoming Energy Secretary Hazel 
O’Leary.43  The industry argued that any tax capable of reducing GHG 
emissions would have to be so high that it would have an undesirable impact 
on the economy and a disproportionate impact on the poor.44  The CoC also 
took an uncompromising stand against any energy tax.45  Long before the 
Clinton Administration drafted proposed legislation, industry lobbyists and 
Astroturf grassroots groups were meeting with—and phoning and sending 
emails to—White House officials and members of Congress, urging them to 
stop the energy tax in its tracks.46  The President publicly complained that 
                                            
37. Hage & Collins, supra note 36; Matthew L. Wald, Pondering an Energy 
Tax That Can’t Please All the People: Experts See Three Practical Ways to Levy a ‘Broad-
Based’ Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1993, at F10. 
38. Hage & Collins, supra note 36; Wald, supra note 37. 
39. Hage & Collins, supra note 36 (referencing coal-producing state 
opposition); Wald, supra note 37. 
40. Eric Pianin & Thomas W. Lippman, Energy Tax Suggestions Propel 
Opponents to the Barricades; Coalitions of Interests Make Enactment Difficult, Analysts Say, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1993, at A10; David Wessel & Rick Wartzman, Energy Interests 
Mobilize Against a New Tax, But Real Fight May Focus on What Form It Takes, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 26, 1993, at A16. 
41. Michael Weisskopf & Steven Mufson, Lobbyists in Full Swing on Tax 
Plan; Some Groups Already Have Shaped Policy, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1993, at A1. 
42. Viveca Novak, An Energy Tax? Ok, If It’s Not on Us, NAT’L J., Feb. 13, 
1993; Wessel & Wartzman, supra note 40. 
43. Industry Repeats Opposition to Taxes as White House Floats Trial 
Balloon, UTIL. ENV’T REP., Feb. 5, 1993, at 3, available at 1993 WLNR 1739616. 
44. Id.; Utilities, Automakers Note Comments by O’Leary That Energy Tax 
May Be Delayed, NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Jan. 25, 1993 (quoting Alan Richardson, 
American Public Power Association). 
45. Pianin & Lippman, supra note 40. 
46. Weisskopf & Mufson, supra note 41; Michael Wines, Clinton Makes 
Lobbyists a Target in Opening Battle over Tax Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1993, at A15. 
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opponents of the carbon tax “ha[d] already lined the corridors of power with 
high-priced lobbyists.”47 
In late January, Secretary of Treasury Lloyd Bentsen announced that 
the incoming Administration was considering an energy tax, and the major 
players in the business community’s influence infrastructure sprang into 
action to shoot down the trial balloon.48  The American Petroleum Institute 
(“API”) hosted a well-attended gathering for all interested companies and 
trade associations at which the message was “[l]et’s not fight each other.”49  
The GCC circulated reports concluding that an energy tax would increase 
unemployment and precipitate an economic downturn.50  A brand new 
association of public utility companies calling itself the Alliance Against a 
Carbon Tax conducted grassroots organizing and lobbying against the tax.51  
A Denver-based think tank called the Center for a New West contracted for 
studies concluding that a carbon tax would cause regional imbalances and 
put more than 600,000 jobs at risk.52  Nearly all electric utility companies 
opposed any tax on electrical energy,53 but Southern California Edison—a 
large utility company that had already invested heavily in natural gas 
facilities—supported a BTU tax.54 
On February 17, 1993, President Clinton announced a four-year 
blueprint for stimulating the American economy that included, among its 
many revenue-enhancing provisions, a BTU tax on nearly all fuels.55  The 
decision to go with a BTU tax, rather than a carbon tax, reflected the 
Administration’s determination to make the proposal as palatable as possible 
to Democrats from coal-producing states by spreading the burden to other 
                                            
47. Wines, supra note 46. 
48. Industry Repeats Opposition to Taxes as White House Floats Trial 
Balloon, supra note 43; Pianin & Lippman, supra note 40. 
49. Novak, supra note 42. 
50. Id.; Pianin & Lippman, supra note 40. 
51. Novak, supra note 42. 
52. Carbon Tax Could Harm Economy, Environment, Think Tank Studies 
Claim, NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 16, 1993. 
53. See Death of Energy Tax Makes Carbon Levy, Other Environmental Taxes 
Less Likely, supra note 3. 
54. AES’ Sant Backs Energy Tax, Citing Environmental, Efficiency Benefits, 
UTIL. ENV’T REP., Apr. 2, 1993, at 13, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
55. Thomas W. Lippman, Energy Tax Would Touch All; Yearly Cost 
Estimated at Up to $150 Per Household, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1993, at A1 [hereinafter 
Lippman, Energy Tax Would Touch All]; Ruth Marcus & Ann Devroy, Asking Americans to 
‘Face Facts,’ Clinton Presents Plan to Raise Taxes, Cut Deficit, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1993, 
at A1. 
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fuels, including nuclear and hydroelectric power.56  Yet, in a victory for 
environmental groups, the proposal exempted wind and solar power from the 
tax.57  The Bill also included additional funding for the federal low-income 
energy assistance program to offset some of the adverse effect on low-
income Americans.58  Since the tax would be hidden in gas, electric, and fuel 
bills, most Americans would probably not notice that they were paying it.59  
The Department of Energy (“DOE”) predicted that the tax would result in the 
reduction of GHG emissions by about 25 million tons per year.60 
Environmental groups supported the proposal.61  Although they 
favored a carbon tax, they were persuaded by Treasury Secretary Bentsen 
that it was politically infeasible.62  They worried that the tax rate was too low 
to result in a reduction of GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, but they 
decided that any increase in the cost of fossil fuels would encourage power 
plants to consider moving to renewable sources of energy.63  And they were 
pleased that President Clinton had chosen the BTU tax over a gasoline tax.64  
Consumer groups were dubious about the tax because of its regressive effects 
on low-income consumers.65  But they applauded the provisions in the 
proposal ensuring that low-income consumers did not bear a disproportionate 
burden of the tax.66  They warned regulated utility companies that if they 
tried to persuade state public utility commissions to allow them to pass the 
tax through to consumers, the groups would argue that the companies already 
                                            
56. Margaret Kriz, A Green Tax?, NAT’L J., Apr. 17, 1997; Energy Tax 
Focuses on Raising Money, Ignores Costs, Officials Growl, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Feb. 22, 
1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1748628. 
57. Lippman, Energy Tax Would Touch All, supra note 55. 
58. Id.; Clinton Plan:  BTU’s Bearing the Brunt, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, 
Feb. 18, 1993, at 1, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
59. Lippman, Energy Tax Would Touch All, supra note 55. 
60. Clinton Plan:  BTU’s Bearing the Brunt, supra note 58. 
61. Environmental Groups Flex for Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, NAT’L 
ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 22, 1993 (quoting Dan Lashof, National Resources Defense 
Council (“NRDC”)); Thomas W. Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has ‘Green’ Tint; 
Environmentalists Back Plan They Helped Draft, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1993, at D1 
[hereinafter Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has ‘Green’ Tint]. 
62. Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has ‘Green’ Tint, supra note 61. 
63. See Environmental Groups Flex for Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, 
supra note 61; Kriz, A Green Tax?, supra note 56 at 917–18 (quoting Dan Lashof, NRDC). 
64. Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has ‘Green’ Tint, supra note 61. 
65. Novak, supra note 42; Economist:  Energy Tax Would Penalize Western 
Coal, Could Hurt Environment, UTIL. ENV’T REP., Mar. 5, 1993, at 3, available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
66. Environmental Groups Flex For Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, supra 
note 61. 
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owed consumers hundreds of millions of dollars in rebates because of 
unexpected declines in interest costs on capital projects.67 
The energy industry was unified in its opposition to the tax.68  The 
API predicted that the tax would cost seven hundred thousand jobs and 
reduce the gross national product by about $5 billion.69  The coal industry 
estimated that coal prices would increase by more than 25%.70  
Manufacturing trade associations argued that it would bring a nascent 
economic recovery to a rapid end.71  Even the natural gas industry was 
unhappy.72  Its primary concern was the decision to collect the tax from 
natural gas producers at the wellhead, rather than from consumers at the 
consumption end of the pipeline.73  At the same time, the major natural gas 
players did not join the chorus of energy interests in the hope that a less 
categorical stand would be more likely to get it a seat at the negotiating table 
when the proposal began to work its way through Congress.74  The Electric 
Generation Association, a trade association representing independent power 
producers, offered qualified support for “a properly structured broad-based 
energy tax.”75  Not surprisingly, the American Wind Energy Association and 
the Geothermal Resources Association strongly supported the proposal, so 
long as wind and geothermal energy remained exempt from the tax.76 
                                            
67. Craig S. Cano, Gas Groups Gain Some Ground in BTU-Tax Debate; 
Discussions Continue, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Mar. 15, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 
1756589 (quoting Edwin Rothschild, Citizen Action). 
68. Republican, Democratic Senators Voice Concern on BTU Proposal, 
NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 26, 1993 (quoting Jerry Jasinowski, National Association of 
Manufacturers). 
69. Administration Figure on Consumer Costs “Grossly Underestimated,” 
Industry Says, NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 24, 1993. 
70. Congress Checks Impact of BTU Tax; NCA Registers Protest, PLATTS 
COAL OUTLOOK, Mar. 1, 1993, at 8, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (discussing a 
perverse effect); Economist:  Energy Tax Would Penalize Western Coal, Could Hurt 
Environment, supra note 65. 
71. Kriz, A Green Tax?, supra note 56 at 919. 
72. Energy Tax Focuses on Raising Money, Ignores Costs, Officials Growl, 
supra note 56 (undermining competitiveness; devastating impact). 
73. Sonali Paul, ‘Where?’ Is Gas Worry over Clinton BTU Tax, PLATTS 
OILGRAM NEWS, Feb. 23, 1993, at 3, available at 1993 WLNR 1726354; President Clinton’s 
Proposal to Tax Energy Sources Including Natural Gas Is Part of Broad Economic Reform 
Program That Also Emphasizes Natural Gas R&D and Use, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., Feb. 18, 
1993, at 1, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
74. See Craig S. Cano, Gas Industry Distancing Itself from Harsh Criticism of 
Energy Tax, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Mar. 1, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1709083. 
75. Energy Tax Focuses on Raising Money, Ignores Costs, Officials Growl, 
supra note 56 (quoting Thomas Dodd, Electric Generation Association). 
76. Environmental Groups Flex for Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, supra 
note 61. 
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Stung by the industry criticism, the Clinton Administration adopted 
“a strategy of placate and conquer.”77  As they worked out the details of a 
proposed bill, high-level officials engaged in a series of meetings with 
industry lobbyists over a two-week period in an attempt to address their 
objections.78  They hoped to convince the industries that an energy tax was 
inevitable and they were better served by working with the Administration 
than by standing on the outside denouncing any energy tax.79  Trade 
associations for the natural gas industry quickly agreed to meet with 
Administration officials to argue that the tax should not be collected at the 
wellhead.80  The manufacturing, petroleum, and electric utility industries 
continued to take a hard line against any energy tax, even though that meant 
that they were not invited to participate in the negotiations.81  The NAM 
assembled an ad hoc 1300-member umbrella group containing a broad array 
of energy, manufacturing, and transportation companies called the 
Affordable Energy Alliance—later renamed the American Energy Alliance—
the exclusive goal of which was to kill the BTU tax.82  It hired two public 
relations firms to conduct a $2 million advertising campaign to generate 
pressure on members of Congress from energy-producing states to oppose 
the tax.83  The Sierra Club responded with a far less resource-intensive 
appeal to its members to urge their representatives to support the tax.84 
President Clinton’s BTU tax proposal got off to a bad start in 
Congress.85  At a hearing conducted by the Senate Committee on Energy and 
the Environment in late February 1993, Committee Chairman Bennett 
                                            
77. Thomas W. Lippman, Administration Courts Energy Tax Foes, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 9, 1993, at D1 [hereinafter Lippman, Administration Courts Energy Tax Foes]. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id.; see White House Firm on BTU Tax, Appears Flexible on Collection 
Point, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Mar. 8, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1718127. 
81. Lippman, Administration Courts Energy Tax Foes, supra note 77; 
Environmentalists Question Utility Efforts to Move BTU Tax Downstream, UTIL. ENV’T REP., 
Mar. 19, 1993, available at 1993 WLNR 1727921 (reporting the position of the EEI). 
82. Compare New Group Formed to Fight BTU Levy; API Part of New Joint 
Effort, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, May 6, 1993, at 3, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com, 
with Lobbyists Boast BTU Tax Beaten in the House, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, May 24, 1993, at 
1, available at 1993 WLNR 1726814. 
83. David S. Hilzenrath, Miscalculations, Lobby Effort Doomed BTU Tax 
Plan, WASH. POST, June 11, 1993, at D1; Timothy Noah, BTU Tax Is Dying Death of a 
Thousand Cuts as Lobbyists Seem Able to Write Own Exemptions, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1993, 
at A18 [hereinafter, Noah, BTU Tax Is Dying Death of a Thousand Cuts as Lobbyists Seem 
Able to Write Own Exemptions]. 
84. Environmental Groups Flex for Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, supra 
note 61. 
85. See Skeptical Senators Reveal BTU Doubts, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, Feb. 
25, 1993, at 4, available at 1993 WLNR 1731982. 
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Johnston (D-Louisiana) expressed his strong opposition to the proposal.86  
The Republican committee members all opposed the BTU tax.87  The Clinton 
Administration failed to provide a witness to defend the tax, and no other 
members of the committee came to its defense.88  In late March, Senator 
Johnston expressed a willingness to support a BTU tax, so long as it was 
collected by electric utility companies directly from consumers—something 
that Administration officials opposed because they feared it would 
precipitate a consumer revolt.89 
In early April, the Treasury Department circulated a draft of a 
modified BTU tax that changed the point of collection for natural gas from 
the wellhead to the local distribution companies and for coal from the coal 
producer to the utility companies that burned the coal.90  The natural gas 
industry remained unhappy with the change because it still did not place the 
burden of payment on the ultimate consumer of the gas.91  The petroleum and 
electric utility industries remained adamantly opposed to the tax.92  The coal 
industry was pleased with the changes, but it continued to oppose the Bill 
because of the disproportionate negative economic impact it would have on 
the industry as a whole.93  The National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners and consumer and environmental groups strongly opposed 
the shift in the collection point.94 
Capitulating to industry pressure once again, President Clinton 
agreed to allow the tax to be collected by utility companies without the 
                                            
86. Craig S. Cano, While Not Sold on Idea, Johnston Cites Keys to 
Implementing BTU Tax, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Mar. 29, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Cano, While 
Not Sold on Idea, Johnston Cites Keys to Implementing BTU Tax], available at 1993 WLNR 
1716991; Skeptical Senators Reveal BTU Doubts, supra note 85. 
87. See Skeptical Senators Reveal BTU Doubts, supra note 85. 
88. Id. 
89. Cano, While Not Sold on Idea, Johnston Cites Keys to Implementing BTU 
Tax, supra note 86. 
90. Treasury Unveils Modified BTU Tax Proposal, CONGRESS DAILY, Apr. 1, 
1993. 
91. Bill Loveless, AGA’s Baly Says Details of BTU Tax Are ‘Major Blow’ to 
Gas Industry, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Apr. 5, 1993, at 5, available at 1993 WLNR 1726625; 
James Risen, Lobbyists Win Changes in Energy Tax Proposal Revenue:  Administration Says 
Some Industries Would Get Exemptions.  Burden Would Shift Closer to Consumers, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1993, at 1. 
92. Patrick Crow, U.S. BTU Tax Plan Revised; Industry Wary of Results, OIL 
& GAS J., Apr. 12, 1993, at 21, 21; Loveless, supra note 91. 
93. See Industry Reacts to BTU Tax Modifications, COAL & SYNFUELS TECH., 
Apr. 19, 1993, at 1. 
94. Jackie Calmes & David Wessel, Clinton Changes Course on Part of 
Energy Tax: Agreement Would Ease Restrictions on Utilities to Pass Along the Levy, WALL 
ST. J., May 11, 1993, at A2; States Try to Blunt BTU Tax Impact, PLATTS OILGRAM PRICE 
REP., Apr. 23, 1993, at 4, available at 1993 WLNR 1727380. 
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approval of state public utility commissions.95  The House Ways and Means 
Committee in mid-May approved a bill that contained this compromise, 
along with a number of exemptions for the aluminum and chlor-alkyl 
industries and farming interests.96  The House, in late May, narrowly 
approved (219-213) the stimulus bill with the BTU provision intact.97  It was 
the first time that either house of Congress had passed legislation aimed at 
reducing GHG emissions.98 
The battle then shifted to the Senate Finance Committee, where the 
CoC and the energy industry hoped to kill it.99  Because Senator David Boren 
(D-Oklahoma) was one of the senators who made up the eleven to nine 
Democratic majority on the committee, he became the target of an intensive 
campaign to influence his vote.100  The Affordable Energy Alliance and CSE, 
a grassroots organization devoted to less government regulation created in 
1984 by the David H. Koch Foundation,101 convened taxpayer rallies in 
Oklahoma, commissioned polls demonstrating strong opposition to the tax in 
Oklahoma, and generated letters and phone calls from his constituents urging 
him to oppose the tax.102  Newspaper ads proclaiming that Senator Boren 
could stop a BTU bill that stood for Big Time Unemployment were part of 
CSE’s $100,000 advertising campaign.103  A direct-mail blitz to more than 
nine thousand Oklahoma community leaders and a corresponding 
telemarketing campaign generated a huge number of pre-written letters and 
calls to Boren’s offices.104  In addition, a study commissioned by several 
                                            
95. Calmes & Wessel, supra note 94. 
96. House Ways and Means Approves Tax Plan With Modified Energy Tax, 
NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), May 17, 1993; Gas Lobby Wins BTU-Tax Concessions as Ways 
and Means Reports Bill, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, May 17, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 
1746071. 
97. In Close Vote, House Sends Energy Tax and Budget Plan on to Senate, 
PLATTS INSIDE FERC, May 31, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1711901. 
98. John M. Broder, Adding Something for Everyone, House Leaders Gained 
a Climate Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A20 [hereinafter Broder, Adding Something for 
Everyone]. 
99. Patrick Crow, BTU Tax Battle Hits Capitol Hill, OIL & GAS J., May 10, 
1993, at 25, 25; Patrick Crow, Clinton’s BTU Tax Starting to Fall Apart, OIL & GAS J., May 
17, 1993, at 24, 24; New Group Formed to Fight BTU Levy; API Part of New Joint Effort, 
supra note 82. 
100. Michael Weisskopf, Fanning a Prairie Fire; Capital Lobbies Stirred 
Oklahomans’ Tax Revolt, WASH. POST, May 21, 1993, at A1; Richard S. Dunham, With 
Friends Like David Boren…, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (June 6, 1993), http://
www.businessweek.com/stories/1993-06-06/with-friends-like-david-boren-dot-dot-dot. 
101. Parry, supra note 14, at 13; Stone, supra note 14, at 1529–30; Weisskopf, 
supra note 100. 
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energy companies from economists at the University of Oklahoma predicted 
that the tax would destroy eleven thousand Oklahoma jobs, devalue farmland 
by $1 billion, and add $180 per year to household energy bills.105  The effort 
paid off when Senator Boren appeared at a rally on Capitol Hill sponsored by 
the Independent Petroleum Association of America to urge the attendees to 
help him kill the tax.106  Senator Boren then assembled a bipartisan group of 
senators to offer an alternative stimulus bill that did not include an energy 
tax.107 
Once it became clear that well placed political pressure could turn 
the President around, it was katy-bar-the-door as lobbyists insisted that their 
clients should not have to pay the tax.108  The NAM maintained that it 
contained so many loopholes that it was unfair to the industries that did not 
have one.109  Then, in late June, Clinton agreed to a giant exemption for the 
entire manufacturing and agricultural sectors of the economy.110  Still, 
Senator Boren refused to vote for any change that included any form of tax 
based on the heat content of fuel.111  The Finance Committee ultimately 
approved a bill with a 4.3¢ per gallon gasoline tax and a number of 
additional spending cuts, but no BTU tax.112  The Senate barely approved a 
deficit reduction bill that contained the modest gasoline tax in late June after 
Vice President Gore broke a fourty-nine to fourty-nine tie vote in which all 
of the Republicans voted against the Bill.113 
Worried that the conference committee might restore the BTU tax, 
both the AEA and CSE launched new advertising campaigns in the districts 
                                            
105. Id. 
106. Gas Lobby Wins BTU-Tax Concessions as Ways and Means Reports Bill, 
supra note 96. 
107. Sonali Paul, Boren Offers BTU Tax Alternative, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, 
May 21, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1753024. 
108. See Jackie Calmes, President’s Call for ‘Shared Sacrifice’ Turns Into 
Scramble Among Lobbyists, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1993, at A3; Noah, BTU Tax Is Dying 
Death of a Thousand Cuts as Lobbyists Seem Able to Write Own Exemptions, supra note 83; 
William Neikirk, Dealing with Reality, CHI. TRIB. (June 20, 1993), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/1993-06-20/news/9306200083_1_special-interests-bill-clinton-mining. 
109. Hilzenrath, supra note 83. 
110. Clinton Expects Senate to Pass Budget Reconciliation Bill This Week, 
NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), June 22, 1993. 
111. Id. 
112. Patrick Crow, U.S. Senate Deficit Bill Shifts Focus to Transport Fuels 
Taxes, Spending Cuts, OIL & GAS J., June 21, 1993, at 19, 19; EEI Concerned That Energy 
Tax May Be Resurrected in Final Budget Package, UTIL. ENV’T REP., June 25, 1993, available 
at 1993 WLNR 1760031. 
113. Eric Pianin & David S. Hilzenrath, Senate Approves Budget Plan, 50-49; 
Vice President Gore Casts Deciding Vote, WASH. POST, June 25, 1993, at A1. 
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of members of committee they deemed to be swing votes.114  The conference 
committee voted out a Bill with the Senate’s gasoline tax, and it passed both 
houses of Congress.115  The trade associations for the energy industry were, 
to say the least, pleasantly surprised by the outcome.116  In a thoughtful 
postmortem gesture, the AEA spent some of its remaining cash on 
newspaper ads thanking the Democratic Senators who had come to the 
industry’s aid.117 
Congress’ failure to pass a BTU tax left President Clinton’s April 
1993 promise to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 in tatters.118  
And the ease with which the business community’s influence infrastructure 
forced the President to abandon the tax did not bode well for legislative 
efforts to address climate change during the remainder of his 
administration.119  Having prevailed in a face-to-face confrontation with the 
new President on his signature climate change initiative, energy industry 
lobbyists correctly predicted that climate change legislation would be a non-
starter for the remainder of the Clinton Administration.120 
B. The Jeffords Cap-and-Trade Bill in the 107th Congress 
Any hope that Congress would enact legislation requiring GHG 
reduction measures appeared dead with the Supreme Court of the United 
States’s declaration that George W. Bush had won the 2000 presidential 
election.121  The Bush Administration was far more concerned with 
increasing domestic energy production than in protecting the environment 
from global warming.122  Indeed, the Administration was not convinced that 
                                            
114. Timothy Noah, Energy Tax Compromise Presents Major Challenge for 
White House, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1993, at A8; Second Anti-Tax Group Targets Legislators 
in Ads, CONGRESS DAILY, July 16, 1993. 
115. Death of Energy Tax Makes Carbon Levy, Other Environmental Taxes 
Less Likely, supra note 3. 
116. See Sonali Paul, Against All Odds:  The Big BTU Victory, PLATTS 
OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 9, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Paul, Against All Odds], available at 1993 
WLNR 1754024 (quoting an unnamed lobbyist for the oil industry). 
117. Id. 
118. See O’Leary:  Losing BTU Tax Would Make U.S. Greenhouse Goal Hard 
to Meet, UTIL. ENV’T REP., June 11, 1993, at 1, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
119. Paul, Against All Odds, supra note 116; Death of Energy Tax Makes 
Carbon Levy, Other Environmental Taxes Less Likely, supra note 3. 
120. Paul, Against All Odds, supra note 116; Death of Energy Tax Makes 
Carbon Levy, Other Environmental Taxes Less Likely, supra note 3. 
121. See Tim Dickinson, Six Years of Deceit, ROLLING STONE, June 28, 2007, 
at 54. 
122. See Guy Gugliotta & Eric Pianin, Bush Plans on Global Warming Alter 
Little; Voluntary Programs Attract Few Firms, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2004, at A1. 
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anthropogenic emissions of GHGs did in fact increase global temperatures.123  
Instead of legislation, the Bush Administration preferred voluntary programs 
with vague and unenforceable targets.124  Nevertheless, President Bush 
recognized the need to place additional controls on grandfathered power 
plants to protect downwind states from long-range transport of nitrogen 
oxides (“NOx”), sulfur dioxide (“SO2”), and mercury emissions; it looked 
for some time like newly appointed EPA Administrator Christine Todd 
Whitman would persuade the President to include GHGs in the Clear Skies 
Bill that the Administration was drafting to address the continuing problem 
of interstate transport.125 
Reports of a possible four-pollutant Clear Skies Bill sent energy 
industry lobbyists and conservative think tanks back into battle mode.126  A 
spokesperson for the CEI called the four-pollutant Bill a colossal mistake.127  
The coal industry and most of the electric utility industry undertook a 
massive lobbying campaign to convince the Administration to take GHG 
emissions out of the Bill.128  One focal point of the lobbying efforts was the 
Vice President’s National Energy Policy Development Group, a task force 
made up of high level governmental officials charged with recommending a 
national energy policy.129  The Cheney Task Force went out of its way to 
meet with lobbyists from the coal, petroleum, and utilities industries to solicit 
their views on what should be included in its report.130  The EEI put together 
                                            
123. Dickinson, supra note 121; Amy Goldstein & Eric Pianin, Hill Pressure 
Fueled Bush’s Emissions Shift, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at A1. 
124. Manimoli Dinesh, Bush Administration Rolls Out Voluntary Plan to Cut 
Pollution, OIL DAILY, Feb. 12, 2003, at 1; Gugliotta & Pianin, supra note 122. 
125. John Fialka & Jeanne Cummings, Bush Clean-Air Plan Born in Gore’s 
Kyoto Playbook, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2001, at A24 [hereinafter Fialka & Cummings, Bush 
Clean-Air Plan in Gore’s Kyoto Playbook]; Eric Pianin, EPA Mulls Limits for Power Plant 
Emissions; Environmentalists Laud White House Effort on Pollution, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 
2001, at A13. 
126. Christopher Drew & Richard A. Oppel Jr., How Power Lobby Won Battle 
of Pollution Control at E.P.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at A1; Fialka & Cummings, Bush 
Clean-Air Plan Born in Gore’s Kyoto Playbook, supra note 125. 
127. Andrew C. Revkin, New Alliance Forms to Cut Plants’ CO(-2) Emissions 
Bush, Key Lawmakers, Industry Join Crusade, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 2001, at 9. 
128. Elizabeth Shogren, U-Turn on Emissions Shows Big Energy Clout; 
Policy:  White House Downplays Any Damage to EPA Chief Caused by Bush’s Reversal on 
Carbon Dioxide Output from Power Plants, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter 
Shogren, U-Turn on Emissions Shows Big Energy Clout]. 
129. Bruce Barcott, Changing All the Rules, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 4, 2004, at 
38, 44; NAT’L ENERGY POL’Y DEV. GRP., NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY (2001), available at 
http://www.wtrg.com/EnergyReport/National-Energy-Policy.pdf. 
130. Drew & Oppel, supra note 126; Judy Pasternak, Bush’s Energy Plan 
Bares Industry Clout; Cheney-Led Task Force Consulted Extensively with Corporate 
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a group of around twenty utility executives to meet personally with Vice 
President Cheney.131  Representing several electric utility companies, former 
Republican National Committee chairman, Haley Barbour, sent a 
memorandum to Vice President Cheney urging the Administration to 
abandon the president’s campaign promise to regulate GHG emissions from 
power plants.132 
Presidential Economic Advisor, Lawrence Lindsey, “then 
convene[d] a series of meetings” at which officials from the EPA, the DOE, 
and the White House debated whether the administration’s Clear Skies Bill 
should include GHGs.133  At the same time, industry lobbyists focused a last-
minute barrage on the White House and sympathetic members of Congress in 
the hope that they would in turn put pressure on the President.134  Participants 
in the lobbying effort were later singled out for special praise for the efforts 
that Thomas Kuhn, the president of the EEI and a former Yale classmate of 
President Bush, had played in pleading the energy industry’s case.135  
Pressure also came from conservative think tanks and advocacy 
organizations.136  Grover Norquist, the head of Americans for Tax Reform, 
and Fred Smith, head of the CEI, complained directly to Bush’s political 
advisor Karl Rove.137 
In mid-March, the President announced that he would not support 
legislation mandating reductions in GHG emissions.138  The announcement 
                                                                                                       
Executives.  Its Findings Boosted Their Interests.  Environmental Groups Had Little Voice, 
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Capitalism, Competitive Enter. Inst., to George W. Bush, President of the U.S. (June 7, 2002), 
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came as a surprise to EPA Administrator Whitman, who was busily assuring 
both the American public and European allies, that the United States would 
regulate carbon dioxide emissions from power plants.139  Environmental 
activists accused the Bush Administration of yielding to industry pressure 
and criticized Whitman for failing to resign after her public humiliation.140  
Whitman gamely defended the President’s decision.141  Denying “that the 
president had ‘pulled the rug out’ from under her,”142 she promised to pursue 
alternative approaches to greenhouse gas reduction that would emphasize 
technology development, nuclear power, and voluntary approaches to 
reducing GHG emissions.143  The CoC and most of the energy industry 
praised the administration for adopting a more balanced approach to climate 
change.144  The greatest benefactors of the decision were coal producers and 
utilities that burned mostly coal in their plants.145 
Prospects for climate change legislation brightened somewhat in 
May 2001 when Senator James Jeffords of Vermont abandoned the 
Republican Party to become an independent who caucused with the 
Democrats.146  A primary reason for the move was Jeffords’ growing 
discomfort with the position of the Bush White House on environmental 
issues.147  In gratitude for returning the Senate to Democratic control, the 
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supra note 139. 
145. Jehl, Bush Defends Emissions Stance, supra note 135. 
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leadership appointed Jeffords to chair the Senate Committee on Environment 
and Public Works.148  Jeffords had already introduced a four-pollutant bill 
that was modeled on the Clean Air Act’s acid rain program.149  The Bill 
would have required every covered source of carbon dioxide (“CO2”)—a 
greenhouse gas—to acquire an allowance for every ton of CO2 that it 
emitted.150  The allowances could come from many sources, including 
purchases at annual government auctions, gifts from the government to ease 
transitions, and purchases from other companies that held extra 
allowances.151  The total number of allowances available in any given year 
would be limited—or capped—by statute, and the caps would gradually 
decrease in accordance with specified statutory benchmarks.152  For example, 
the bill provided for reducing CO2 emissions to 1990 levels by 2012.153 
At this point, however, noticeable fracture lines were beginning to 
appear in the energy industry’s approach to climate change.154  The natural 
gas industry was disappointed with the Bush Administration’s disavowal of 
the president’s campaign promise, as were a few companies in the electric 
utility industry that had already invested heavily in nuclear power and natural 
gas-fired power plants and had begun to implement energy conservation 
measures, sometimes in response to state GHG reduction initiatives.155  
Concluding that GHG controls were inevitable, they valued the certainty of 
knowing what the rules would be as they planned future projects.156  In June, 
“a coalition of seven electric [power] companies” calling itself the Clean 
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Energy Group drafted a four-pollutant bill that would have cut CO2 
emissions to 2000 levels by 2008 and to 1990 levels by 2012.157  Utility 
companies more heavily invested in coal generating capacity and nearly all 
coal companies, however, remained steadfastly against any form of 
mandatory restrictions on GHG emissions.158  Eight coal-dependent utility 
companies created a new group called the National Electric Reliability 
Coordinating Council to lobby against climate change legislation.159 
To no one’s surprise, the proposed limitations on power plant 
emissions in the Bush Administration’s Clear Skies Bill did not reach 
GHGs.160  Despite strong support from the energy industry, however, the 
proposal got a lukewarm reception in Congress.161  Instead, the Senate 
Environment and Public Works Committee marked up the Jeffords Bill.162  
No electric utility companies supported the Bill.163  An umbrella group 
purporting to represent “‘more than 75,000 businesses and millions of 
workers and energy consumers’” called the Coalition for Affordable and 
Reliable Energy (“CARE”) predicted that the Bill would cause “escalating 
energy prices and significant risk of electricity shortages for American 
consumers and businesses.”164  Despite President Bush’s threat to veto any 
bill that contained mandatory limits on GHG emissions,165 the Committee, 
after a bitter debate, voted largely along party lines to approve the Jeffords 
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Bill in late June.166  Jeffords offered to work with the Bush Administration to 
come up with a consensus bill, but EPA Administrator Whitman replied that 
“‘the door [was] closed’” on any negotiations that included a cap on CO2 
emissions.167  With a presidential veto assured, the Senate leadership decided 
not to take the Jeffords Bill to the floor.168  That turned out to be the death 
knell for climate change legislation for the next four years because the 
Republicans regained control of the Senate in the 2002 elections.169 
C. The McCain-Warner-Boxer Bill in the 110th Congress 
With both the House and the Senate controlled by the Democrats 
after the 2006 elections, the prospects for climate change seemed as bright as 
they had been in years.170  The new chairperson of the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works was Barbara Boxer (D-California), an 
outspoken proponent of climate change legislation, who characterized the 
Bush Administration’s record on climate change as worse than dismal.171  
Sensing a groundswell of public opinion in support of legislation,172 she 
hoped to make climate disruption a bipartisan issue.173  Boxer was joined in 
her enthusiasm by Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-New Mexico), the incoming 
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chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee.174  And some 
former skeptics in Congress––like Senators Ted Stevens and Lisa 
Murkowski of Alaska––were persuaded by the growing evidence of 
shrinking glaciers and disappearing permafrost that global warming was 
real.175 
The picture was not entirely rosy for proponents of climate change 
legislation, however, because a large number of Democratic members 
represented rust belt and energy-producing states that could be adversely 
affected by climate disruption legislation.176  Moreover, the election had 
taken a huge toll on moderate Republicans from the Northeast, thereby 
dimming the prospects for truly bipartisan legislation.177  In the House, 
Representative John Dingell (D-Michigan) replaced climate change denier 
Joe Barton (R-Texas) as chairperson of the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, but Dingell was wary of any environmental legislation that 
affected the automobile manufacturers in his district.178  Finally, President 
Bush retained his veto power,179 and the Administration remained deeply 
opposed to any legislation providing for mandatory GHG emissions 
reductions.180 
Most of the climate disruption bills introduced at the outset of the 
110th Congress employed some variation of a cap-and-trade regime, but they 
presented a bewildering array of options on many critical issues.181  One 
issue was whether to apply the cap-and-trade regime to all sectors of the 
economy or just to power plants.182  Another was whether to allocate 
allowances to sources free of charge during the early years or auction them 
off to the highest bidders.183  Of those allowances given away to power 
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plants, another issue was whether to do so on the basis of the amount of 
electricity the plant produced—an option that would favor companies that 
relied on renewable energy and natural gas because they would have excess 
allowances to sell to coal-burning plants that produced much more CO2 per 
unit of electricity produced—or on the heat input of the fuels burned in the 
plant—an option that would favor coal-burning plants because it would 
prevent renewable energy and natural gas-burning plants from getting credit 
for the fact that they produced fewer CO2 emissions per unit of heat input.184  
Still another issue was whether or not the cap-and-trade program should 
contain a safety valve guaranteeing an upper price for allowances by 
requiring the EPA to sell all allowances demanded above the safety valve 
price, even though that would have the effect of raising the cap.185  A final 
issue was whether or not to preempt state GHG emissions reduction 
programs.186 
Sensing that the political winds were changing, some electric utilities 
began to shift their position from adamant opposition to any mandatory 
climate change legislation to grudging acceptance of the need for limits on 
GHG emissions.187  They were not opposed to a cap-and-trade program for 
GHG emissions so long as it did not single out the electric utility industry, 
allocated a substantial proportion for allowances free of charge in the early 
years, began auctioning allowances only after carbon control and 
sequestration (“CCS”) technologies were commercially available—most 
likely ten to twenty years in the future—, required little upfront expenditure, 
pushed the deadlines far into the future, and provided generous safety valves 
that ensured stable prices at some level.188  Beset by internal division, the 
EEI maintained a position of studied neutrality on the desirability of a cap-
and-trade regime for GHG emissions.189  The oil and gas industry continued 
to oppose mandatory climate change legislation, but indicated its willingness 
to support a properly designed cap-and-trade regime that also preempted all 
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state climate change laws.190  The coal industry maintained its strong 
opposition to any climate change legislation whatsoever.191 
Senator Boxer kicked off congressional consideration of climate 
change legislation with an ambitious series of nine hearings on climate 
change over three months.192  As the hearings progressed, it became apparent 
that some Republicans could support a cap-and-trade bill, if it would meet 
the electric utility industry’s demands and would eliminate the EPA’s highly 
successful new source review program under which the Justice Department 
was seeking very large penalties from most of the nation’s prominent electric 
utility companies.193  Others, like Senator James Inhofe and Representative 
Joe Barton remained skeptical of both the scientific basis for global warming 
claims and cap-and-trade as a tool for reducing GHG emissions.194 
As the hearings were wrapping up in April 2007, the Supreme Court 
of the United States delivered a landmark opinion that dramatically changed 
the political calculus.195  The Court held GHGs were pollutants and EPA 
therefore had authority to regulate GHG emissions from autos and—by 
implication—from other sources such as power plants and refineries.196  This 
meant that if EPA found that GHGs endangered public health or the 
environment, it could begin regulating GHG emissions from new sources and 
modifications of existing sources.197  If Congress did not enact legislation 
saying otherwise, EPA could proceed ahead with stringent technology-based 
standards that would have no trading opportunities and no blow-softening 
provisions like free allocations of allowances and safety valves.198  The fact 
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that the Bush Administration remained strongly opposed to mandatory 
measures, however, ensured that EPA was not likely to act in the immediate 
future.199 
Sensing no movement on any of the pending Democratic bills, 
several senators began to work on bipartisan alternatives.200  Senators Joe 
Lieberman (I-Connecticut) and John Warner (R-Virginia) unveiled a 
proposal for a more stringent bill that called for a cap-and-trade regime 
applicable to all sectors of the economy that would have capped GHG 
emissions at the 2005 level by 2012, 15% below the 2005 level by 2020, and 
70% below the 2005 level by 2050.201  Of the initial allowances, 24% would 
have been auctioned, 20% would have been given to the power sector, 20% 
would have been given to the industrial sector, and 2.5% to the transportation 
sector.202  The proportion of allowances auctioned would gradually increase 
to 52% in 2035.203  Revenues from the auctions would be channeled to low- 
and moderate-income consumers and technology development projects.204  
The proposal included a novel cost containment provision that would have 
created an administrative board that could authorize cost relief measures to 
companies presented with unexpected economic hardship.205  The electric 
utility industry presented a nearly united front in opposition to the 
Lieberman-Warner Bill.206  Only Exelon and Pacific Gas & Electric, 
companies that relied heavily on nuclear power and natural gas respectively, 
supported the Bill.207 
As it became clear that a climate change bill containing mandatory 
caps was likely to reach the Senate floor, utility company executives huddled 
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“behind closed doors with White House [aides] and administration officials” 
to come up with a legislative approach to a cap-and-trade program that more 
closely reflected what the industry had in mind.208  The favored approach 
would have preempted state climate change laws and replaced EPA’s new 
source review program.209  The authority to regulate GHG emissions would 
have been delegated to the DOE, rather than EPA.210  And, GHG reductions 
would have been required only when proven technologies were available.211 
The Environment and Public Works Committee passed the 
Lieberman-Warner Bill with only a few minor amendments by a vote of 
eleven to eight.212  Only one Republican—Senator Warner—voted yes.213  
The Bill now had to clear the sixty vote hurdle necessary to halt the 
Republicans’ promised filibuster.214  The Bill’s sponsors began a lengthy 
process of negotiating the concessions that would be necessary to persuade 
ten to tweleve Republicans and nearly all coal-state Democrats to vote to cut 
off debate.215  By the time that the negotiations were nearing completion in 
January 2008, a persistently sluggish economy had dimmed enthusiasm for 
comprehensive climate change legislation.216  Nevertheless, the Democratic 
leadership assured the Bill’s supporters that it would go to the floor in early 
2008.217 
In the meantime, climate change legislation was moving at a snail’s 
pace in the House.218  At the outset of the 110th Congress, Majority Leader 
Pelosi created a special committee to address climate change issues and 
appointed long-time climate change activist Representative Edward Markey 
(D-Massachusetts) to head it, but the committee lacked the jurisdiction over 
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any actual legislation.219  The Energy and Commerce Committee, which had 
jurisdiction over climate disruption legislation, was preoccupied with the 
Bush Administration’s energy bill.220  In sharp contrast to Senator Boxer’s 
committee, it failed to hold a single hearing on climate change legislation 
during 2007.221  The chairperson of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over 
the climate disruption legislation was Rick Boucher (D-Virginia), a moderate 
Democrat who represented a coal-producing district in Virginia.222  Although 
Boucher had been a global warming skeptic, he now believed that legislation 
was necessary to forestall EPA action.223  Convinced that coal should play a 
major role in electricity generation for the foreseeable future, he insisted that 
the rate at which GHG reduction technologies became available to coal-fired 
power plants should determine how rapidly the government required GHG 
emissions reductions.224 
In mid-January 2008, representatives of a new group, called the 
Climate Action Partnership—consisting of environmental groups and more 
than thirty companies concerned about global warming—urged Congress to 
enact mandatory climate change legislation “on a fast-track basis.”225  They 
called for a 60% to 80% reduction in GHG emissions from 2005 levels by 
2050 and for a 10% to 30% reduction during the first fifteen years.226 
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Before drafting a bill, Boucher took the unusual step of having the 
subcommittee staff draft a series of public position papers on issues that were 
likely to arise when the committee considered a bill.227  As the position 
papers trickled out through the spring of 2008,228 it became clear that the bill 
that Representative Boucher had in mind was considerably less stringent than 
the Lieberman-Warner Bill in the Senate.229 
When the Lieberman-Warner Bill came to the floor of the Senate 
during the first week of June 2008, the lobbyists for the affected interests 
were out in force.230  The CoC joined with oil and gas and mining interests to 
create the Alliance for Energy and Economic Growth to send Congress the 
message that the Lieberman-Warner Bill would harm the economy with little 
resulting impact on global warming so long as China and India failed to 
reduce GHG emissions.231  The NAM opposed the Bill on many grounds.232  
Another advocacy organization for the business community, the Club for 
Growth, launched “a radio and [television] ad[vertising] campaign against 
the bill in states [with] senators [who were] potential[ly] swing votes.”233  
Even the natural gas industry opposed the legislation because it required 
natural gas processors to purchase allowances instead of end users.234  
Environmental groups had reservations about the Bill and favored more 
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stringent requirements in several regards, but they united behind the Bill 
after the sponsors made several changes designed to meet their objections.235 
On the day before the scheduled cloture vote, President Bush 
threatened to veto any bill that contained mandatory limits on GHG 
emissions.236  With such formidable opposition lined up against the Bill, it 
was clear to the Bill’s sponsors that it would be impossible to line up the 
sixty votes necessary to prevent a filibuster without making major 
concessions that would be opposed by environmental groups and could cause 
progressive Democrats to abandon the effort.237  Despite its poor prospects, 
Democratic strategists believed that the party would benefit in the upcoming 
elections by forcing Republicans to vote against climate change 
legislation.238  Recognizing the political risks involved, the Republican 
leadership shifted its strategy away from outright refusal to acknowledge the 
reality of global warming to an insistence that the Lieberman-Warner Bill 
intruded too deeply into the American economy.239  Reflecting the laissez 
faire minimalist view espoused by the conservative think tanks, they argued 
that the Bill amounted to little more than a stealth tax on American 
consumers.240 
                                            
235. See Cathy Cash, Senate Gears Up to Debate Landmark Greenhouse Gas 
Bill, with Price Tag Estimated at $7 Trillion, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., May 26, 2008, at 1 
[hereinafter Cash, Senate Gears Up to Debate Landmark Greenhouse Gas Bill, with Price Tag 
Estimated at $7 Trillion], available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary 
Materials”; search and select “Electric Utility Week”; search “Senate Gears up to Debate”); 
Peter Haldis & Joanna Franco, Lieberman-Warner Climate Change Bill Fails to Overcome 
Filibuster, WORLD REFINING & FUELS TODAY, June 9, 2008; Political Wrangling Locks Up 
Senate’s Debate of Climate Change Legislation; Industrial User Groups React Negatively to 
the New Version of Lieberman-Warner; Congressional Budget Office Estimates Bill Would 
Cost Private Sector “Tens of Billions,” supra note 230. 
236. Darren Goode, White House Threatens Veto Against Global Warming Bill, 
CONGRESS DAILY (PM ED.), June 7, 2008. 
237. Scott, Climate Change:  Talks on Cap-and-Trade Bill Accelerate As 
Concerns Raised over Cost, Other Issues, supra note 234; Cash, Senate Gears Up to Debate 
Landmark Greenhouse Gas Bill, with Price Tag Estimated at $7 Trillion, supra note 235; 
Kathleen Hart, Nuclear Power Amendment Seen As Potential Key to Passing Carbon Cap-
and-Trade Bill, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., Apr. 28, 2008, available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary Materials”; search and select “SNL Electric 
Utility Report”; search “Nuclear Power Amendment”). 
238. Scott, Climate Change:  Talks on Cap-and-Trade Bill Accelerate As 
Concerns Raised over Cost, Other Issues, supra note 234. 
239. Stephen Power, Washington Battle over Climate Change Heats Up; 
Senators Stake Out Stances in Debate of ‘Cap-and-Trade,’ WALL ST. J., June 3, 2008, at A6 
[hereinafter Power, Washington Battle over Climate Change Heats Up]. 
240. Robert Dillon, US Senate Takes Up Landmark Climate Change 
Legislation, OIL DAILY, June 4, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 25595641 (quoting Senator 
Christopher Bond (R-Missouri)); Power, Washington Battle over Climate Change Heats Up, 
supra note 239. 
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/3
2014] THE DISRUPTIVE POLITICS OF CLIMATE DISRUPTION 423 
As expected, the 48-36 vote in favor of cloture did not reach the 
sixty-vote majority necessary to end the filibuster.241  The full Senate never 
debated the merits of the Bill.242  After the vote, Senate Majority Leader Reid 
pulled the Bill and announced that it would not be taken up again during the 
110th Congress.243 
D. The Waxman-Markey Bill in the 111th Congress 
The 2008 elections appeared to mark a major shift in the politics of 
climate disruption.244  Both houses of Congress remained under the control 
of the Democratic Party, and the Democratic majority in the Senate had 
reached the magic number of sixty.245  The voters also sent to the White 
House a charismatic young Democrat who had promised during the 
campaign to make climate change legislation one of his top priorities.246  
President Obama featured climate disruption in his inaugural address, and he 
promised to “‘work tirelessly to . . . roll back the specter of a warming 
planet.’”247  To demonstrate his commitment to climate change legislation, 
he hired former EPA Administrator Carol Browner as a White House 
Advisor and charged her with directing the Administration’s legislative 
efforts on matters relating to energy and the environment.248  At the same 
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time, many states were already putting climate change regulatory programs 
into effect, and the EPA was rapidly proceeding ahead with an endangerment 
finding and associated regulatory programs.249 
In the House, Speaker Pelosi re-authorized the Select Committee on 
Energy Independence and Global Warming and re-appointed Representative 
Edward Markey (D-Massachusetts) to head it.250  In an audacious move, 
Representative Henry Waxman (D-California) challenged Representative 
John Dingell (D-Michigan) for the chairmanship of the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce,251 and he prevailed by a vote of 137–122 in the 
Democratic caucus.252  The CEI proclaimed that the Waxman election 
provided “a loud wake-up call to American business leaders that the 111th 
Congress is not going to play nicely with them on energy rationing 
policies.”253 
Having wrested control of the committee from Representative 
Dingell, Chairman Waxman announced that the 111th Congress had “‘an 
opportunity that comes only once in a generation’” to enact landmark climate 
change legislation.254  He and Speaker Nancy Pelosi hoped to move a bill out 
of his committee by Memorial Day with an eye toward enactment by the end 
of the year.255  But Waxman first had to patch up the wounded feelings of 
Dingell’s supporters and reach an accommodation with Democrats from 
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coal-dependent states who were already banding together to defend their 
states’ economic interests.256 
If anyone was capable of steering the climate change bill through the 
treacherous waters of the House of Representatives, it was the energetic 
Henry Waxman.257  He was in an excellent position to work with the White 
House because his former aide of more than twenty years, Philip Schiliro, 
was President Obama’s liaison to Congress.258  But Waxman’s committee 
had a full plate of important bills, including the president’s health care 
reform bill, which taxed even his formidable capacity for hard work.259  He 
therefore delegated to Representative Markey, who replaced Representative 
Boucher as chairperson of the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, the 
responsibility for drafting the initial bill.260 
As Waxman’s committee began a series of hearings on climate 
disruption, the Reality Coalition, an umbrella organization composed of 
several of the nation’s largest environmental groups, sponsored an 
advertising campaign featuring a yeti and a mermaid holding lumps of coal 
to make their point that coal could not play a major role in America’s energy 
future.261  At the committee’s first hearing in mid-January, it received 
testimony on the Blueprint for Legislative Action that the Climate Action 
Partnership had drafted.262  The blueprint’s goal was to achieve a 42% 
reduction in emissions from 2005 levels by 2030 and an 80% reduction by 
2050.263  It allocated a substantial portion of the allowances on the basis of 
historical emissions and contained cost containment measures to act as a 
safety valve.264  The blueprint allowed companies to purchase offsets from 
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companies that agreed to improve the efficiency of their operations or 
farmers who agreed to plant more carbon absorbing vegetation.265  Despite 
the substantial industry support for the blueprint, the Republican members of 
the committee rejected the cap-and-trade proposal and argued that Congress 
should consider a carbon tax instead.266 
President Obama signaled his support for a cap-and-trade regime 
with auctioned allowances in February 2009 when he included in his fiscal 
year 2010 budget request a surprisingly detailed description of what the 
President wanted to see in a climate change bill, including a GHG emissions 
cap of 14% below 2005 levels by 2020 and 83% below 2005 levels by 
2050,267 with 100% of the allowances to be auctioned to prevent the dirtiest 
emitters from reaping windfall profits.268  The coal industry and coal-
dependent electric utility companies strongly objected to the President’s 
suggestion that 100% of allowances should be auctioned.269  If that 
happened, executives from American Electric Power and Duke Energy 
predicted electricity rates in some states—like Indiana—would go up by as 
much as 40%.270 
In mid-March, Senator Boxer and Representatives Waxman and 
Markey met with the White House staff to come up with a strategy for 
passing climate change legislation.271  They agreed on the broad contours of 
a comprehensive energy and climate change bill that would create an 
economy-wide cap-and-trade regime.272  Since Boxer had the votes in her 
committee to report out a bill at any time, they decided that the House Bill 
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should move forward first to give the Senate sponsors some idea of what was 
possible.273 
In late March 2009, Representatives Waxman and Markey 
introduced a 648-page discussion draft to serve as a starting point for the 
Energy and Commerce Committee’s consideration of climate change 
legislation.274  Based on the Climate Action Partnership blueprint,275 the Bill 
would have established an economy-wide cap-and-trade regime that capped 
GHG emissions at 20% below 2005 levels by 2020, at 42% below 2005 
emissions in 2030, and at 83% below 2005 levels by 2050.276  The Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) would have managed the primary 
allowance market.277  The draft did not specify the percentages of allowances 
that would have been given away and auctioned; nor did it specify how the 
revenues from the auctions would have been spent.278  The draft would have 
allowed emitters to increase emissions over their allowances if every four 
tons of emissions were offset by five tons of emissions reductions from other 
domestic or international sources.279  It would have “create[d] a ‘strategic 
reserve’ of . . . 2.5 billion allowances” for EPA to auction to emitters in times 
of price volatility to stabilize allowance prices.280  To further increase 
flexibility, it would have allowed a source to borrow allowances from next 
year for this year’s emissions.281  The draft also contained a renewable 
energy portfolio standard that would have required electrical generators to 
derive at least 25% of their production from renewable energy by 2025.282 
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The Waxman-Markey draft also contained a number of provisions to 
reduce predictable opposition; to make the coal industry happy, the Bill 
created a $10 billion pool to finance carbon capture and storage and related 
technologies.283  To mollify the electric utility industry, the Bill prohibited 
the EPA from regulating GHGs under its existing Clean Air Act authorities 
and suspended state climate change programs for five years until the federal 
program got underway.284  To please environmental groups, a citizen suit 
provision would have empowered private citizens to sue the federal 
government for failing to enforce the Bill’s requirements.285 
EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson and the Secretaries of Energy and 
Transportation praised many aspects of the draft without giving it the 
Administration’s formal endorsement.286  In response to anticipated 
complaints from the “no we can’t” crowd that the proposal would cause huge 
increases in electric bills, Jackson cited an EPA analysis of the draft 
concluding that it would have only a modest effect on consumers—27¢ to 
38¢ per day—if it retained its generous offset program and if most of the 
revenues from the auctions of allowances went to regulated local distribution 
companies.287  The Climate Action Partnership applauded the Bill as a strong 
starting point for a bill, but said it would insist that a substantial number of 
allowances be awarded for free to emitters.288  Environmental groups and 
clean energy companies also supported the draft, but they were somewhat 
taken aback by Waxman’s decision to limit EPA’s Clean Air Act authority to 
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regulate GHG emissions and to preempt state climate change laws for five 
years without demanding any concessions from industry in return.289  
Democratic committee members from coal-producing states did not support 
the draft as written.290  Among other things, they believed the 20% by 2020 
goal was highly unrealistic.291  Republicans were unified in opposition 
against the draft bill.292 
Coal-dependent electric utility companies and the EEI supported the 
cap-and-trade concept, but they refused to support a bill that did not 
distribute free allowances to emitters.293  They strongly opposed the 
renewable portfolio requirement, arguing that states were in a better position 
to impose such measures.294  The CoC and several conservative think tanks 
objected to all of the measures in the draft.295  The Heritage Foundation 
predicted that the Bill would impose a cost of $1600 a year on the average 
household and kill as many as three million manufacturing jobs.296  The head 
of the CEI promised that his organization would “‘work to see that it dies as 
quickly as possible.’”297 
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The CoC’s adamant opposition to any climate change legislation 
caused three electric companies, PG&E, PNM Resources, and Exelon, to 
terminate their memberships in protest.298  The companies preferred to live 
with the limited restrictions of a cap-and-trade program than with the 
uncertainties of no legislation or the strictures of EPA regulation under the 
Clean Air Act.299  The American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity 
(“ACCCE”)—which included mining companies and electric utility 
companies—also lost members over its opposition to climate disruption 
legislation.300  Duke Energy, Alstom Power, and Alcoa no longer wanted to 
be associated with a group that did not acknowledge the reality of climate 
disruption and the need for legislation to deal with it.301 
President Obama dealt climate disruption legislation a minor setback 
when he decided to make health care reform his top legislative priority, after 
which the White House became absorbed in lengthy—but ultimately 
unproductive—negotiations with House and Senate Republican leaders over 
the content of the health care bill.302  Pressed by the need to take up President 
Obama’s health care legislation, Chairman Waxman decided to skip the 
subcommittee markup of the Waxman-Markey Bill and move directly to 
markup by the full committee.303  But that required him to reach an accord 
with the committee’s coal-state, oil-patch, and rust-belt Democrats and the 
lobbyists for the coal, oil refining, and manufacturing industries that were 
pressuring them.304  Hoping to move the issue along, President Obama met 
with all of the Democratic committee members at the White House, at which 
time he indicated that he was willing to compromise on key issues.305  As an 
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Change, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2009, at A18 [hereinafter Mufson, New Groups Revive the 
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302. See ALTER, supra note 246, at 115–16. 
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CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), May 7, 2009 [hereinafter Goode, Waxman, Checking Clock, 
Sticks to Memorial Day Goal]; see also ALTER, supra note 246, at 260. 
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305. See Scott, Legislation:  Energy Committee Democrats Reach Deal on Key 
Issues, supra note 304. 
38
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/3
2014] THE DISRUPTIVE POLITICS OF CLIMATE DISRUPTION 431 
example, he dropped his opposition to giving free allowances to emitters 
during the first years of the program.306 
Soon thereafter, on May 12, 2009, Waxman announced that the 
Democratic committee members had reached an agreement on a 932-page 
bill that they all could support.307  Waxman agreed to lower the 2020 target 
for GHG emissions reductions from 20% below 2005 emissions to 17%.308  
He also agreed to give away more than half of the allowances to emitters and 
local distribution companies during the early years.309  The largest portion—
35%—would go to local distribution companies and would cover 90% of the 
current emissions of the electric utilities that provided their electricity.310  
The formula for dividing up allowances within the electric utility industry 
was derived from a consensus agreement arrived at by the EEI after two 
years of internal negotiations and was based on a fifty-fifty formula under 
which half of a plant’s allowances would be based on emissions and half on 
energy output.311  The agreement, however, left coal-dependent rural 
electrical cooperatives out in the cold.312  In order to win the support of oil-
patch and rust-belt Democrats, billions of dollars worth of free allowances 
would go to energy-intensive manufacturing industries (15%), gas utility 
companies (9%), refineries (2%), and automobile manufacturers (3%).313  
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And the renewable energy mandate would drop from 25% by 2025 to 20%, 
with up to 8% coming from state efforts to enhance efficiency.314 
Republican members of the committee prepared more than four 
hundred proposed amendments to the Bill in an effort to slow it down and 
hone their message that the Bill would kill jobs, harm consumers, and have 
little beneficial effect on the environment.315  As the Republican members 
rallied against the astronomical costs of the Bill and the threat of 
environmental socialism, Democratic members chastised them for failing to 
negotiate in good faith over possible bipartisan amendments.316  After a week 
of late-night markup sessions, the full committee voted out a bill that did not 
differ in any important way from the Democrat’s compromise bill.317  Four 
Democrats from Utah and the South voted against the Bill, and only one 
Republican from California voted for it.318 
As the Energy and Commerce Committee was completing its work, 
trouble loomed on the horizon in the form of a request by Representative 
Collin Peterson (D-Minnesota) to have the Bill referred to the Agriculture 
Committee that he chaired.319  Frequently at odds with environmental groups, 
Peterson had made light of global warming by stating that it would allow 
Minnesota farmers to grow more corn.320  Peterson had a long list of issues 
that would have to be addressed to his satisfaction before he would be 
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willing to support the Bill.321  Among other things, he wanted to protect 
United States farmers from international competition in the market for 
offsets, increase the allowances given to rural electrical coops and municipal 
power plants, and prohibit Wall Street banks from trading in the allowance 
markets.322  He reported that forty-five additional Democrats shared his 
concerns.323 
Lobbyists for farming and forestry interests stepped up their efforts 
to influence members of the House Agriculture Committee.324  Constituents 
in the districts of all of the Democratic members of the House Agriculture 
Committee received emails and robocalls from the National Republican 
Congressional Committee and other opponents of the Bill characterizing it as 
a “job-killing climate bill.”325  Six organizations representing farmers and 
ranchers demanded that the Bill be amended to allow unlimited offsets from 
domestic, but not foreign, agriculture and forestry; notwithstanding the fact 
that GHG emissions from cattle—approximately one-quarter of United 
States methane emissions—and tilling soil on farms had been excluded from 
the Bill.326  Another farmer alliance called for amending the Bill to provide 
for a list of pre-approved farming practices, such as planting trees, preserving 
forests, and no-till farming practices that would offset GHG emissions.327  
Both groups agreed with Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack’s 
                                            
321. Hagstrom, Peterson Raises Concerns About House Climate Measure, 
supra note 319. 
322. Jean Chemnick, Corn-Ethanol Spat Could Derail Major Climate Bill, 
PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, June 1, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 11440851; Fahrenthold, 
House Panel Passes Limit on Greenhouse-Gas Emissions, supra note 317; Goode, Panel 
Completes Climate Marathon, supra note 318; Hagstrom, Peterson Raises Concerns About 
House Climate Measure, supra note 319. 
323. Goode, Panel Completes Climate Marathon, supra note 318; see also 
Chemnick, Corn-Ethanol Spat Could Derail Major Climate Bill, supra note 322. 
324. Agriculture Groups Seek to Limit EPA Offset Role Under Climate Bill, 
INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., June 5, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 10694952. 
325. Darren Goode, House Dem Leaders Reach Out to Disparate Caucuses, 
CONGRESS DAILY, June 10, 2009 [hereinafter Goode, House Dem Leaders Reach Out to 
Disparate Caucuses], available at 2009 WLNR 11126252. 
326. Steven D. Cook, Legislation:  Farm Groups Call for Climate Legislation to 
Allow Unlimited Agricultural Offsets, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 1286 (June 5, 2009) 
[hereinafter Cook, Legislation:  Farm Groups Call for Climate Legislation]; Dina Cappiello, 
Mythical Tax Has Farmers Defending Cow Gas; Powerful Lobby Ensures That Agriculture Is 
Exempt from Methane Regulation, WASH. POST, June 28, 2009, at A2; For the Farm Lobby, 
Too Much Is Never Enough, WASH. POST, June 26, 2009, at A18. 
327. Cook, Legislation:  Farm Groups Call for Climate Legislation, supra note 
326. 
41
McGarity: The Disruptive Politics of Climate Disruption
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
434 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
recommendation that Congress give the United States Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”) the authority to manage the offsets program.328 
Waxman hoped to work out a deal with Peterson to avoid a nasty 
fight over amendments to the Bill in the Agriculture Committee.329  Peterson 
was especially miffed by the fact that rural electric cooperatives received so 
few allowances in comparison to those awarded to utilities on the East and 
West Coasts.330  Peterson also insisted on the transfer to USDA as a 
condition to going forward with the bill.331  Waxman then met with the heads 
of the EEI and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association 
(“NRECA”) to iron out a compromise on the allocation issue that would be 
acceptable to the rural cooperatives.332  Two days before the June 26th floor 
debates, Waxman and Peterson struck a deal in which Waxman effectively 
capitulated to the demands of farm-state Democrats.333  USDA would 
oversee the offsets markets.334  The Bill required non-coal-dependent 
companies to surrender some of their allowances to coal-dependent rural 
cooperatives, allocating 0.5% of allowances specifically to small utility 
companies that generated “less than [four] million megawatt hours.”335  The 
net effect of the changes was to channel billions of dollars worth of 
allowances to the agricultural sector and to lodge a critical piece of the 
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regulatory program in a department that had historically placed agricultural 
interests over environmental concerns.336 
As the Bill neared consideration by the full House at the end of June, 
however, President Obama began to vigorously lobby Democratic members 
to vote for it.337  EPA released an analysis of the most recent version that 
concluded that the average annual household cost of compliance with its 
provisions would be somewhere between $80 and $111, or 22¢ and 30¢ per 
day.338  In other words, the Bill was quite affordable.  Despite EPA’s 
assessment, the National Republican Congressional Committee aired 
advertisements featuring its claim that the Bill would add $1800 to the 
average annual electric bills of middle-class families.339 
The bill that the House took up on June 26 had expanded to more 
than 1200 pages, reflecting dozens of deals that Waxman and Markey had 
made with wavering Democrats.340  Nevertheless, the major environmental 
and consumer groups held their collective noses and supported the 
compromise bill with all of its warts.341  Several groups, including EEI,342 the 
AGA,343 and the NRECA,344 supported the Bill, but planned to demand 
changes in the Senate.345  The trade associations for farming interests and 
rural electric cooperatives were pleased with the changes, but divided on 
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whether to support the overall Bill.346  The CoC, the NAM, the Independent 
Petroleum Association of America, and the ACCCE all opposed the Bill.347 
The Bill passed by a narrow 219–212 margin.348  Forty-four House 
Democrats—nearly 20%—voted against the Bill, and eight Republicans 
voted for it.349  The fact that the Climate Action Partnership supported the 
Bill made it easier for some Democrats to vote favorably.350  The final Bill 
established a multi-sector cap-and-trade regime that capped GHG emissions 
at 17% below 2005 emissions by 2020, 42% by 2040, and 83% by 2050.351  
The allowance markets were overseen by the FERC and the allowance 
derivatives markets by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”).352  The Bill set aside allowances for the EPA to distribute to 
various public and private beneficiaries in accordance with formulas 
provided for in the statute.353  Beginning in 2026, the allowance gifts would 
be gradually phased out until they ended in 2035, at which point all 
allowances would be allocated by auction.354  The allowances set aside for 
the electric utility industry would be allocated to local distribution companies 
so that state public utility commissions would have the power to ensure that 
retail consumers received their economic benefit.355 
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Instead of reducing emissions, emitters could purchase offset credits 
on a one-to-one basis—not the five-to-four basis of the original Bill.356  Each 
offset credit would represent one ton of CO2 emissions removed from the 
atmosphere by declining to engage in activities that would otherwise result in 
CO2 emissions; planting vegetation to take CO2 out of the atmosphere, 
capturing methane emissions from cow manure, or other forms of permanent 
carbon sequestration.357  The USDA would oversee the offset markets.358  
The Bill established an overall limit of two billion tons of offset credits per 
year, only half of which could come from international sources.359  The Bill 
also contained a renewable energy portfolio mandate under which utilities 
would be required to generate 15% of their electricity from renewable 
sources and save 5% from energy efficiency by 2020.360  This was far less 
ambitious than many existing state renewable energy standards.361  To 
provide a safety valve, the bill established a $25 per megawatt–hour 
alternative compliance payment that a utility company could pay in lieu of a 
renewable energy credit.362  Finally, the Bill retained a technology-based 
requirement—new power plants would have to emit 50% fewer GHGs and 
plants built after 2020 would have to emit 65% fewer GHGs than existing 
plants.363 
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In anticipation of Senate consideration of the House-passed bill, a 
number of governmental and private sector entities produced analyses of the 
House bill.364  In late July, the USDA released a study concluding that the 
Waxman-Markey Bill would impose very little short-run cost in the form of 
increased prices for fuel and fertilizer on farms, and in the long run, farmers 
would come out ahead because of the ability to sell offsets to GHG emitting 
companies.365  An analysis prepared by the DOE’s Energy Information 
Administration concluded that the Bill would probably increase average 
household energy costs by $114 in 2020 and $288 in 2030.366  A study 
prepared for NAM by Science Applications International Corporation, by 
contrast, concluded that the Bill would reduce the gross domestic product by 
a minimum of 1.8% by 2030, reduce household income by at least $730, and 
bring about the loss of at least 1.7 million jobs.367  The Heritage Foundation 
warned that the Bill could cause gasoline prices to go up 74% by 2035.368 
E. The Kerry-Graham-Lieberman Bill in the 111th Congress 
The lobbyists for the various interest groups now turned their 
attention to the Senate, where things were moving with far less dispatch than 
in the House.369  As in the House, the CoC and many coal and oil companies 
joined the CEI and the Heritage Foundation in opposing all climate change 
legislation.370  Many groups that had supported the final House Bill now 
hoped to persuade the Senate to include provisions that had been deleted 
from the House Bill or remove provisions from the House Bill that they had 
failed to defeat.371  The electric utility industry came together to lobby for 
lower targets for the caps, less ambitious deadlines, more allowances for 
electric utilities, and a price collar that would set a minimum and a 
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maximum price on allowances.372  The high end of the price collar would act 
as a safety valve to ensure against disruptive price spikes, and the low end 
would provide assurance to a company and its bankers that the price of 
allowances would not drop below the statutory price, as it was comparing the 
purchase of allowances to investing in GHG emissions reductions 
technologies.373  The NRECA wanted the Senate to distribute all allowances 
based on the carbon content of the fuel used, rather than using the EEI 
formula that distributed half on the basis of electrical output.374  A new group 
of coal-dependent power companies called Generators for Affordable Power 
was formed specifically with the goal of ensuring that unregulated merchant 
generators received their fair share of allowances in any cap-and-trade 
legislation.375 
Environmental groups wanted the Senate to set the 2020 cap at 20% 
below 2005 emissions and to require all allowance trading to be conducted on 
regulated public exchanges.376  They strongly objected to giving the USDA 
authority over offsets and allowance trading.377  In addition, they urged the 
Senate to prohibit any source that was out of compliance with the Clean Air 
Act’s requirements for conventional pollutants from receiving free allowances 
and from purchasing offsets in the climate change program.378  They also 
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urged the senators to refrain from preempting EPA and state regulation of 
GHG emissions under their existing authorities.379 
Senator Barbara Boxer, who remained chairperson of the 
Environment and Public Works Committee, decided to proceed cautiously 
until she was confident that she had sixty votes lined up to end the 
guaranteed Republican filibuster.380  To accomplish this, she had to seek an 
accommodation with a group of sixteen Democratic senators from coal-
dependent states that had coalesced during the defeat of climate change 
legislation in the 110th Congress.381  The committee kicked off its work on 
the climate disruption Bill with a hearing on July 7th featuring EPA 
Administrator Lisa Jackson, Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, Secretary 
of Energy Steven Chu, and Interior Secretary Ken Salazar;382 all four of 
whom urged the committee to report out a bill similar to the House Bill.383  
At the same time, Senator Boxer and Senator John Kerry (D-
Massachusetts)—a strong supporter of stringent climate change legislation—
met with coal-state, farm-belt, and rust-belt Democrats to address their 
concerns and to negotiate over potential changes to the Bill.384 
Agricultural interests dominated the hearing that the Senate 
Agriculture Committee held in late July 2009.385  They argued that up to 5% 
of the allowances should go directly to farmers to offset the higher prices 
they would probably have to pay for fuel and fertilizer after cap-and-trade 
provisions went into effect.386  The American Farm Bureau Federation 
(“AFBF”) continued to oppose the Bill in its entirety.387  The Democrats on 
the Committee were sympathetic to the pleas for more allowances, while the 
Republicans tended to take the AFBF position that no bill was necessary.388  
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Committee Chairman Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) expressed support for an off 
ramp that would allow the United States to abandon the cap-and-trade 
program if China and India declined to implement equivalent programs in the 
near future.389 
Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Montana) also 
claimed jurisdiction over both the allowance allocation and the international 
trade aspects of any cap-and-trade bill.390  Baucus represented Montana, a 
major coal-producing state with a large number of rural cooperatives, and he 
was determined to protect the interests of both industries.391  He sided with 
the coal-dependent utility companies who believed that free allocations to 
electric companies should be based on historical emissions alone and not on 
the EEI’s 50–50 formula that also relied on energy output.392  The Finance 
Committee heard from economists from across the political spectrum who 
urged the Senate to abandon the idea of allocating allowances for free and to 
distribute allowances through a more efficient auction.393  An economist for 
the Environmental Defense Fund testified in support of the House Bill, 
which, in his view, channeled 43% of the value of the allowances to 
consumers.394  But Baucus made it clear that he was not sold on the 
allocation arrangements in the House Bill.395 
While Congress took its August recess, a river of money flowed into 
grassroots efforts to build support for and against climate disruption 
legislation.396  The NAM and the National Federation of Independent 
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Businesses spent several million dollars on television ads in thirteen swing 
states characterizing such legislation as anti-jobs and anti-energy.397  
Americans for Prosperity, an offshoot of Citizens for a Sound Economy that 
was likewise funded by the Koch brothers—whose petroleum interests were 
directly affected by the proposals—hosted eighty grassroots events at which 
speakers asserted—erroneously—that backyard barbeques would be taxed if 
Congress enacted the House Bill.398 
The AEA arranged a bus tour through coal-producing and 
manufacturing states to stir up public opposition to any climate change 
bill.399  The CoC staged its own road show demanding that EPA hold a 
modern “Scopes Monkey Trial” to debunk the evidence that GHG emissions 
caused global warming.400  Another industry-funded grassroots group called 
Energy Citizens sponsored rallies featuring ready-made signs for members of 
the crowds to display to local media and a video of a country western star 
bemoaning the higher energy costs that would follow the enactment of a 
climate change bill.401  Still another industry-funded group called CO2 is 
Green, which was created in 2009 for the purpose of influencing the climate 
disruption debate, began running advertisements in Montana and New 
Mexico aimed at Senators Max Baucus and Jeff Bingaman, arguing that 
increasing GHG emissions would help the planet’s ecosystems and that 
reducing them would kill jobs.402  Several thousands of oil industry 
employees were bussed to a rally against climate disruption legislation in 
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downtown Houston, where they enjoyed hamburgers and hot dogs, heard a 
local high school band, and received free t-shirts saying, “I’ll pass on $4 
gas.”403 
To rally support for climate change legislation, environmental 
groups purchased television ads, operated phone banks, and sponsored public 
events.404  The Alliance for Climate Protection, a group assembled by former 
Vice President Al Gore, and the Blue-Green Alliance, an umbrella 
organization of environmental groups and labor unions, undertook a twenty-
two-state, Made in America Jobs Tour to demonstrate how such legislation 
would create good jobs.405  In September, a coalition of sixty-eight 
environmental, labor, civil rights, and consumer groups calling itself the 
Clean Energy Works Campaign, launched a $20 million advertising 
campaign, run by a former top media advisor to the Obama presidential 
campaign to support the enactment of climate change legislation.406  A major 
grassroots effort to generate calls, letters, and emails to key members of 
Congress accompanied the ad campaign.407 
Flanked by military veterans, clean energy entrepreneurs, and state 
and local lawmakers, Senators Boxer and Kerry, in late September, unveiled 
an eight hundred-page draft climate disruption bill.408  The Bill established a 
cap-and-trade regime for all facilities emitting more than 25,000 tons of 
GHGs per year that reduced GHG emissions by 20% below 2005 levels—
higher than the House bill’s 17%—by 2020, 41% by 2030, and 83% percent 
by 2050.409  Although the draft resembled the House Bill on many critical 
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issues, it contained some important differences.410  For example, it 
established a soft price collar that set a minimum price for auctioned 
allowances of $10 per ton and created a strategic reserve of allocations to be 
sold at a minimum price of $28 per ton at first and increasing 5% plus 
inflation per year for five years and by 7% plus inflation per year 
thereafter.411  Unlike the House bill, the Bill would have preserved EPA’s 
authority to apply the new source review and new source performance 
standards of the Clean Air Act to GHG emissions.412  The draft left some 
critical questions unanswered because they came under the jurisdiction of 
other committees.413  Although 25% of the allowances would be auctioned in 
the early years—more than the 15% in the House bill—the Bill did not 
address how the remaining allowances would be allocated among the 
targeted recipients.414  The Finance Committee would have to resolve those 
issues.415  It also failed to specify which agency would oversee the allowance 
and allowance derivatives markets.416 
The draft was an immediate flop with the audience that mattered 
most—Democratic senators from coal-producing, oil-patch, and rust-belt 
states.417  Senators Ben Nelson (D-Nebraska) and Mary Landrieu (D-
Louisiana) said they would not vote for the Bill because it adopted a cap-
and-trade approach.418  Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-West Virginia) called the 
Bill a “‘disappointing step in the wrong direction’” because it did not give 
electric utilities sufficient time to develop and deploy CCS technology.419  
Senators Byron Dorgan (D-North Dakota) and Kent Conrad (D-North 
Dakota) thought the 20% by 2020 emissions reduction target was too 
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ambitious.420  Senator Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri) was also concerned 
about the Bill’s aggressive deadlines.421  When not a single Republican 
senator ventured out of the fold to support the Bill, it became clear that 
supporters did not have nearly enough votes to overcome a promised 
Republican filibuster.422 
Unwilling to concede failure, Senator Kerry made an overture to 
Senator Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) to come up with a bill that 
could attract bipartisan support.423  In a New York Times editorial, on October 
11th, Senators Kerry and Graham announced that they had come up with a 
framework for climate disruption legislation that would attract the necessary 
sixty votes.424  In support of their framework, they argued that sending “$800 
million a day to sometimes-hostile oil-producing countries threaten[ed] 
[national] security.”425  They warned opponents of the legislation that failure 
to act would leave climate change regulation to EPA and the clumsy tools 
available to it under the Clean Air Act.426  President Obama immediately 
jumped on the bandwagon.427  In a speech at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, the President praised Kerry for reaching out to Republicans, and 
he attacked “the naysayers” who pretended that global warming was not an 
issue.428 
While Senators Kerry and Graham drafted their Bill, Kerry and 
Senator Boxer filled in some missing details of the Kerry-Boxer Bill, made 
some minor adjustments, and added some allowance giveaways to make it 
more palatable to affected industries.429  At that point, the Bill had blossomed 
                                            
420. Scott, Legislation:  Bill Maintains Emissions Cuts, supra note 409. 
421. Kerry-Boxer Climate Bill Poses New Challenge to Environmental Groups, 
INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Oct. 2, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 19327749. 
422. Cathy Cash, Utilities Take Long View on Cap-and-Trade Bill, PLATTS 
MEGAWATT DAILY, Oct. 27, 2009 [hereinafter Cash, Utilities Take Long View on Cap-and 
Trade Bill], available at 2009 WLNR 22505882; Juliet Eilperin & Michael D. Shear, Obama 
Urged to Intensify Push for Climate Measure; Backers Fear Administration Is Giving Issue 
Short Shrift, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2009, at A3. 
423. John Kerry & Lindsey Graham, Yes We Can (Pass Climate Change 
Legislation), N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at WK11. 
424. Id. 
425. Id. 
426. See id. 
427. Darren Goode & George E. Condon, Jr., Obama Praises Bipartisan 
Climate Efforts, CONGRESS DAILY (PM ED.), Oct. 23, 2009. 
428. Id. 
429. See John M. Broder, Senate Global Warming Bill Is Seeking to Cushion 
the Impact on Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2009, at 16; Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, 
Senate’s Climate Bill a Bit More Ambitious; Early Version Would Cap Carbon Allowance 
Prices—and Deficit, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2009, at A3. 
53
McGarity: The Disruptive Politics of Climate Disruption
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
446 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
to 923 pages.430  EPA predicted that the Bill would cost consumers $79 to 
$80 each year per household in increased prices for energy and consumer 
products, about the same as the House Bill.431  The Environment and Public 
Works Committee held a quick series of three hearings on the Kerry-Boxer 
Bill,432 and it went straight to committee markup over the strenuous 
objections of Republican committee members who boycotted the markup 
sessions.433  In the absence of the Republican members, the committee 
quickly voted out the Bill.434  Although it was highly unlikely that the Bill 
would attract sixty votes, the Senate leadership now had a vehicle to take to 
the floor where it could be amended or even replaced with a completely 
different bill at the appropriate time.435 
As hopes for the Kerry-Boxer Bill faded, the efforts of Senators 
Kerry and Graham to craft a bipartisan bill assumed greater importance.436  
Soon after their editorial appeared, Senator Joe Lieberman (I-Connecticut) 
joined the effort.437  They met with Energy Secretary Steven Chu, Interior 
Secretary Ken Salazar, and Energy Czar Carol Browner at the White House 
to ascertain the Administration’s position on the elements—like expediting 
nuclear power plant licensing and opening offshore areas to oil and gas 
drilling—that some Republicans deemed critical to supporting a cap-and-
trade bill.438  In early November, the CoC suggested that it might support a 
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bill reflecting the approach outlined in the Kerry-Graham editorial.439  
Lieberman called the letter a game changer because it signaled that the three 
sponsors might be able to bring a large segment of the business community 
to the negotiating table.440  An industry lobbyist acknowledged that “‘Kerry-
Graham-Lieberman is where the game will be decided.’”441 
Senator Graham’s attempts to forge a bipartisan bill, however, 
attracted the wrath of the AEA, which spent almost $300 thousand on a 
series of radio, television, and online advertisements just before Halloween, 
warning that one of the “‘scary stories coming out of Washington’” was that 
Senator Graham “‘support[ed] . . . a national energy tax called cap-and-
trade.’”442  Environmental groups responded with a more modest ad 
campaign asking why “‘[o]ut-of-state interests [were] attacking’” Senator 
Graham for “‘backing an energy plan that produces more power [for] 
America.’”443 
In the meantime, the electric utility industry’s compromise over the 
allocation of allowances among regulated electric utility companies, as 
reflected in the EEI’s 50-50 formula, was unraveling.444  Coal-burning 
Midwest utility companies and rural electric cooperativeswhich had not 
been involved in the EEI negotiationscomplained that they would have to 
purchase offsets or install GHG reduction technologies to meet the steadily 
decreasing caps of the House and Senate bills, while non-coal-dependent 
utility companies would receive a substantial share of the allowances they 
needed without having to do much in the way of reducing emissions or 
purchasing credits.445  Representatives of the non-coal-dependent companies 
argued that their computer modeling showed that the costs of the Bill were 
evenly divided among all utility companies.446 
The split was also widening between regulated utility companies and 
unregulated merchant companies.447  The regulated companies joined the 
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rural electric cooperatives and two associations of public utility commissions 
in a letter to senators, arguing that the only way to ensure that the benefits of 
the free allowances award to the industry flowed through to consumers was 
to limit them to companies subject to state utility commission 
requirements.448  Unregulated utility companies, they argued, would just 
channel the savings to their shareholders.449  EEI attempted to smooth over 
both contentious issues by asking the Senate to allocate more allowances to 
all utility companies and to set a price ceiling for allowances as a safety 
valve, a solution that was sure to anger environmental groups.450 
The efforts to move climate disruption legislation through the Senate 
received a bolt from the blue in November 2009, when more than three 
thousand purloined emails and documents to and from scientists involved in 
preparing a report for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change were 
leaked to the press.451  The emails, which were taken from East Anglia 
University’s Climate Research Unit, revealed that some of the hundreds of 
scientists involved in preparing the report had attempted to prevent papers 
from climate change skeptics from being published in scientific journals.452  
Critics also saw evidence in the emails of attempts to hide scientific data and 
to manipulate the data to fit particular theories of global warming.453  As 
Senator James Inhofe demanded that the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee conduct a full-scale investigation into the scandal, a 
spokesperson for the CEI boasted that “[w]e may be close to having [the 
legislation] permanently stymied.”454 
The revelations did not undermine the integrity of the science 
underlying the report.455  Several re-examinations of the scientific 
underpinnings of the report chastised the scientists for belittling fellow 
scientists and for poor choices of words in their emails, but otherwise 
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supported the conclusions reached in the report.456  The scandal did, 
however, arrest the forward momentum of climate disruption legislation.457  
If nothing else, the need to investigate the incident gave wavering Democrats 
a reason to urge the leadership to slow down the process until after the 2010 
elections.458 
As the prospect for climate change legislation faded and it began to 
look like the Republican Party might regain control of the House in the 
upcoming elections, British Petroleum, ConocoPhillips, and Caterpillar, Inc. 
announced that they would not be renewing their memberships in the 
Climate Action Partnership.459  A spokesperson for ConocoPhillips said that 
passing a bill had become such a high priority for the group that it was no 
longer attempting to ensure that the substance of the bill was workable for all 
companies in the coalition.460  Since it did not appear that Congress would be 
enacting climate change legislation, the companies decided to pursue what 
was in the best interest of their shareholders and consumers.461  More than 
twenty other large companies, however, remained in the coalition.462 
As the Senate was wrapping up its work on the President’s health 
care legislation in early March, Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham held 
a series of meetings with senators from both parties to attract their support 
for the Bill that they were still in the process of drafting.463  They made it 
clear that they would consider alternatives that were less stringent than the 
House Bill to bring more senators into the fold.464  At the same time, 
President Obama and high-level administration environmental officials met 
with thirteen senators to try to hammer out a compromise that could be 
featured in the Kerry-Lieberman-Graham Bill.465  At the meeting, the 
                                            
456. Somerville Testimony, supra note 455, at 40; see also Kintisch, Panel 
Faults IPCC Leadership but Praises Its Conclusions, supra note 455, at 1135 (report not 
undermined). 
457. See Coral Davenport, EPA’s Power Struggle, NAT’L J., Sept. 24, 2010; 
Strassel, supra note 451. 
458. Strassel, supra note 451. 
459. Stephen Power & Ben Casselman, Defections Shake Up Climate 
Coalition, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2010, at A1. 
460. Id. 
461. Obama Forced to Dial Down Ambitions for Climate Initiative, 
ELECTRICITY CURRENTS, Apr. 2010, at 1, 2. 
462. Power & Casselman, supra note 459. 
463. Swing-Vote Senators Show Interest in Narrower, Sector-Based Climate 
Bill, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Mar. 10, 2010, available at http://insideepa.com/Environmental-
Policy-Alert/Environmental-Policy-Alert-03/10/2010/swing-vote-senators-show-interest-in-
narrower-sector-based-climate-bill/menu-id-1095.html. 
464. See id. 
465. Darren Goode, Senate Trio Taps Obama’s Support On Deal, CONGRESS 
DAILY (PM ED.), Mar. 9, 2010 [hereinafter Goode, Senate Trio Taps Obama’s Support on 
57
McGarity: The Disruptive Politics of Climate Disruption
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
450 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
President seemed open to the possibility of implementing a cap-and-trade 
regime quickly for the electric utility industry, but taking a more deliberate 
approach to reducing emissions from the manufacturing sector.466  Although 
a consensus position did not emerge from the meeting,467 it did clarify that a 
multi-sector cap-and-trade bill like the House and Kerry-Boxer Bills was not 
a serious option.468  At Kerry’s request, former President Bill Clinton began 
lobbying wavering senators, explaining to them that climate disruption 
legislation would create thousands of jobs and make the nation more 
competitive.469  The constant refrains of climategate, war on coal, and cap 
and tax at Tea Party rallies and in the conservative media echo chamber had 
found their way into the mainstream media, and the public was souring on 
the idea of climate disruption legislation.470 
Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham concluded that they could win the 
votes of oil-patch, rust-belt, and coal-state Democrats, as well as a few 
persuadable Republicans if they could soften the resistance of the CoC, the 
API, and coal-dependent electric utilities.471  Over the course of two weeks in 
late March, they met the CoC, more than a dozen trade associations, and 
various other industry groups to solicit their input on the measures the 
senators were considering to make their bill more attractive to industry.472  
The Bill “would regulate power plants beginning in 2012,” but would not 
extend to other industrial sectors until 2016.473  The Bill would establish a 
cap-and-trade regime with a hard price collar limiting the amount paid 
allowance to between $10 and $30 per ton, as adjusted for inflation.474  The 
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targets for the caps would be 17% of 2005 emissions by 2020 and 80% by 
2050—lower than the House bill.475  The cap-and-trade regime would 
preempt EPA and state regulation of GHGs.476  For the transportation sector, 
the Bill would levy a tax on fuel at the pump—not at the refinery where the 
oil companies would most likely bear some of the cost.477  The Bill would 
also encourage faster permitting of nuclear power plants and open up more 
offshore areas for oil and gas development.478  The industry groups were 
delighted that the senators had gone to such lengths to allow them to 
participate in the drafting process.479 
The direction in which the three senators were moving deeply 
concerned their progressive colleagues.480  Senator Bernie Sanders objected 
to the provisions preempting EPA and the states, the support for nuclear 
power, and the decision to open up more offshore areas to oil and gas 
development.481  A group of senators led by Senator Bill Nelson of Florida 
urged the trio not to include offshore oil and gas drilling in the Bill.482  
Several state attorney generals joined the National Association of Clean Air 
Agencies in complaining about the trio’s position on preempting EPA 
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regulation and state law.483  Environmental groups were also deeply 
concerned about the concessions.484  With the 2010 off-year election 
campaigns not going well for the Democrats, the groups realized that if 
Congress did not enact a bill, however compromised, by the end of the year, 
the prospects for climate change legislation in the next Congress were quite 
grim.485  Most were willing to hold their noses and acquiesce in the changes 
contemplated by the three senators, but others were less inclined to 
compromise.486 
Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham scheduled a press 
conference for Monday, April 26, 2010 to roll out their long-awaited Bill.487  
Six days before the rollout, however, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid told 
the Democratic leadership that he was moving immigration reform ahead of 
climate disruption legislation on the legislative agenda.488  The move 
infuriated Senator Graham, who viewed the move as “‘nothing more than a 
cynical political ploy’” to attract Hispanic votes in the upcoming election.489  
He announced that he was no longer willing to support the Bill if 
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immigration reform remained on the Senate’s agenda.490  Senator Reid 
quickly backtracked,491 but Senator Graham was not mollified.492  Under 
attack in his home state from Tea Party activists, he may have welcomed the 
opportunity to separate himself from climate disruption legislation.493 
If Graham’s departure was not enough to sink the Bill, the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout, which began on April 20, 2010 and continued 
throughout the summer, ensured that the Bill’s provisions for opening up 
more offshore areas to deepwater drilling was no longer viable.494  In 
addition, Senator Bill Nelson (D-Florida) promised to filibuster any bill that 
contained such a provision.495  Taking that provision out of the Bill, 
however, would cause the oil and gas industry to oppose it with the 
consequent loss of support from oil-patch senators.496 
Senators Kerry and Lieberman introduced their 987-page Bill 
without Senator Graham on May 12, 2010 to little fanfare, because the 
Senate was absorbed in the Deepwater Horizon spill.497  Not a single 
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Republican supported the Bill.498  The Bill resembled the outline that the 
three senators had described earlier in the year, but with some important 
details filled in and many additional giveaways.499  It would have established 
a cap-and-trade regime with a 2020 cap 17% reduction from 2005 emissions 
and a 2050 cap of 83% reduction.500  The program would take effect in 2013 
for power plants, but would not kick in for the manufacturing and natural gas 
distributing companies until 2016.501  The Bill provided such generous 
allowances that many sources would not have to purchase allowances—or 
reduce GHG emissions—for several years.502  Allowances would be 
allocated to unregulated merchant generators in an amount equal to half of 
their emissions, but the percentage would diminish to zero by 2029.503  The 
formula for allowances for the electric power industry allocated 75% on the 
basis of emissions and 25% on the basis of retail sales, rather than the 50–50 
split of the House Bill.504  Two-thirds of the proceeds from the auctions 
would go immediately back to consumers through their local electricity 
distributors.505 
The Bill allowed emitters to purchase offsets, but at least 75% of all 
offsets had to be produced domestically, unless sufficient domestic offsets 
were unavailable.506  Trading of allowances, derivatives, and offsets would 
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be overseen by the CFTC.507  The Bill contained a hard price collar with a 
floor of $12 and a ceiling of $25.508  It required the EPA to write technology-
based standards requiring new coal-fired power plants to reduce GHG 
emissions by 50% and by 65% after 2020, and it preserved the EPA’s 
authority to require states to write technology-based standards for existing 
power plants for non-criteria pollutants.509  To please coal-fired power plant 
owners and the coal industry, the Bill contained a line charge on sales of 
electricity to finance research on CCS technology.510  To make natural gas 
producers happy, it included tax incentives and faster environmental 
permitting for existing plants that converted from coal to cleaner fuels.511  
For the nuclear power industry, the Bill contained $2 billion to $6 billion in 
direct support and an increase from $18.5 billion to $54 billion in loan 
guarantees.512  The Bill contained a provision giving states a veto over 
offshore oil and gas drilling in adjacent waters, but it preempted state and 
regional GHG emissions programs.513 
The EEI and most investor owned electric companies and 
representatives of environmental groups were present at the unveiling to 
express their support for the Bill.514  The CoC and the API remained 
neutral.515  The Midwestern Climate Coalition and the NRECA said that it 
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would withhold judgment until they saw EPA’s cost analysis of the Bill.516  
The American Public Power Association complained that the price cap was 
too high and that it provided too many allowances to unregulated merchant 
generators.517  Although some major oil and gas producers supported the 
Bill, the natural gas industry’s umbrella group, America’s Natural Gas 
Alliance, was not high on the Bill, because it did not provide sufficient direct 
incentives to use natural gas over coal.518 
Environmental groups were concerned about the provisions 
preempting the states’ power to regulate GHG emissions, providing 
incentives for nuclear power plants, and allowing offshore drilling, even with 
the state veto power.519  Despite those concerns, a group of environmental, 
labor, and military veterans groups spent $11 million on a series of television 
advertisements and an associated online campaign in states of wavering 
senators, suggesting that viewers urge their senators to support broad climate 
disruption and energy legislation.520  Other environmental groups opposed 
the Bill; Frank O’Donnell of Clean Air Watch criticized Kerry and 
Lieberman for following an inside-the-beltway strategy that ultimately failed 
to attract a single Republican supporter.521  The National Association of 
Clean Air Agencies also opposed the Bill because it preempted state 
regulation of GHG emissions.522 
Supporters of cap-and-trade legislation got a minor boost in mid-
June when EPA’s analysis of the Kerry-Lieberman Bill concluded that it 
would have a relatively modest impact on consumers.523  The average annual 
cost per household would be between $79 and $146, compared with the $80–
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$111 cost that EPA attributed to the House bill.524  In early July, the 
Congressional Budget Office released a report concluding that complying 
with the Kerry-Lieberman Bill would be slightly less expensive than 
complying with the House bill.525  In addition, public opinion polls taken 
during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill showed that two-thirds of the public 
supported mandatory limits on GHG emissions.526 
As the oil continued to spew from the Deepwater Horizon well, 
President Obama met with a group of Democratic and Republican senators to 
discuss the possibility of linking a legislative response to the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill with a cap-and-trade bill that would be limited to the 
electric utility industry.527  Most of the Republican senators were unwilling 
to consider any form of cap-and-trade bill and they urged the President 
instead to pour federal dollars into research on GHG emission reduction 
technologies.528  The meeting ended with no agreement on a framework for 
moving forward.529 
In late July, Senator Reid announced that neither the Democratic 
leadership nor the President had been able to cobble together sixty votes for a 
climate disruption bill of any size or shape.530  They had therefore called a 
halt to their efforts.531  Climate disruption was now in the hands of the EPA, 
which was exercising its limited power under the Clean Air Act, and states 
that were willing to take on that controversial topic.532  The conservative 
think tanks turned their attention to enacting legislation calling a halt to those 
climate change initiatives.533 
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IV. LESSONS LEARNED 
A. Introduction 
What can we learn from these four attempts to enact climate 
disruption legislation over the past twenty years?  Some lessons are obvious 
and bear little analysis.  Thus, one lesson to take away from the fate of 
climate change legislation during the 107th Congress is that it is very 
difficult to enact legislation that the president strongly opposes when your 
party controls only one House of Congress.534  This section of the article will 
probe some less obvious lessons that the past failures to enact climate 
disruption legislation may have for future attempts to enact similar 
legislation or any other environmental legislation that the business 
community is likely to oppose. 
B. Powerful Institutions Are Aligned Against Regulatory Legislation 
Any attempt to enact domestic policy legislation over the objections 
of the business community must contend with the institutions that it has 
erected to protect its interests and to advance a laissez faire minimalist 
agenda.  The idea and influence infrastructures that the business community 
put into place over the past thirty-five years were steadfastly opposed to 
climate disruption legislation, and they played an important role in 
forestalling that legislation.  Three think tanks—the Heritage Foundation, the 
CEI, and the George C. Marshall Institute—have played prominent roles in 
the ideological air wars over climate change.535  Over the years they have 
provided a constant stream of laissez faire minimalist critiques of 
government regulation that has found its way into the public consciousness 
as it resonates through the conservative media echo chamber.536  Industry-
sponsored climate change skeptics in academia—many of whom are 
affiliated with one or more conservative think tanks—have likewise played 
an important role in the debates over climate change legislation by instilling 
doubt about the reality of climate disruption in the public consciousness.537  
Both the think tank scholars and the industry-sponsored scientists have made 
themselves freely available to mainstream press reporters who feel duty 
                                            
534. See supra Part III.B. 
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bound to present both sides of public controversies.538  The net result is that 
an appreciable segment of the United States population believes that GHG 
emissions do not cause climate disruption and that, even if they did, 
government regulation is not the right way to go about limiting GHG 
emissions. 
The business community’s influence infrastructure has had an even 
more powerful influence on the progress of climate disruption legislation.  
The CoC—the largest and most visible mouthpiece of the business 
community—and the NAM have consistently opposed every bill that would 
have imposed mandatory restrictions on GHG emitters.539  And they have 
invested tens of millions of dollars on advertising campaigns in the districts 
of key members of Congress, maintaining websites on climate change issues, 
and contributing to the campaigns of sympathetic candidates.540 
Over the years, industry trade associations—like the EEI, the API, 
and the AGA—have spent millions of dollars hiring lobbyists, financing 
studies of the impacts of various bills, hosting briefings, generating calls and 
emails from their members to key legislators, participating in meetings with 
members and committee staffs, and working with business-supported 
grassroots organizations to stir up public opposition to climate disruption 
legislation.541  Individual companies have hired their own lobbyists to serve 
as soldiers in the ground wars.542  These troops may aim their fire at one 
another on narrow issues like the proper allocation formula for free 
allowances, but they tend to fall in line with the trade associations and the 
broader business community on issues like whether allowances should be 
auctioned or given away and whether stringent caps should kick in before 
CCS technology becomes easily available to electric utility companies. 
The pro-business media echo chamber has provided a robust 
opportunity for the public to hear the business community’s position on 
controversial issues like climate disruption.  Fox News commentators railed 
against cap and tax legislation, and its coverage of coal-related issues often 
flashed “War on Coal” across the bottom of the screen.543  During the 
debates over climate disruption legislation in the 110th and 111th Congress, 
Fox News commentator Steven Milloy provided a steady stream of criticism 
                                            
538. GELBSPAN, supra note 28, at 9, 19, 33–34; MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 
54–55. 
539. Kriz, Warm-Button Issue, supra note 30, at 322; see also MCGARITY, 
supra note 6, at 107–08; Stone, supra note 14, at 1529–30. 
540. Stone, supra note 14, at 1529–30. 
541. Id. at 1529–31. 
542. Id. at 1529–30. 
543. E.g., Obama’s Energy Policies Hurting the Economy? at 1:12–2:16 (Fox 
Business television broadcast May 22, 2012), available at http://video.foxbusiness.com/v/
1651158905001/obamas-energy-policies-hurting-the-economy/#sp=show-clips. 
67
McGarity: The Disruptive Politics of Climate Disruption
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
460 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
of advocates of climate disruption legislation and ready access to a national 
audience for climate disruption skeptics on his Junk Science show and 
blog.544 
Finally, the grassroots organizations that the business community 
created to stir up public opposition to unwanted legislation have proven very 
effective in the battles over climate disruption legislation.  CSE was an early 
generator of grassroots opposition to the BTU tax, and its successor 
organization, Americans for Prosperity, generated targeted opposition to later 
climate disruption bills and played critical roles in the Tea Party movement 
that has moved the Republican Party even farther away from support for 
climate disruption legislation.545  In addition to these relatively longstanding 
organizations, the energy industry created a number of ad hoc organizations 
like the AEA and Energy Citizens to wage extremely effective grassroots 
campaigns against climate change legislation in the districts of likely swing 
voters in Congress.546 
The BTU tax battle provided an early example of how adept the 
business community’s idea and influence infrastructures were at framing 
attempts by the energy industry to avoid its environmental responsibilities as 
worthy crusades to preserve jobs and enhance economic growth.547  They 
argued that a BTU tax was not in the public interest, not because it forced 
energy companies to choose between paying the tax or reducing emissions, 
but because it would raise prices for consumer goods, reduce economic 
activity, and bring about job loss.548  It was much harder on the other side to 
characterize a complex tax on the energy content of fuels as a much-needed 
tool to protect the planet from a host of maladies that might or might not 
flow from global temperatures that might or might not be increasing.549 
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C. America is Deeply and Widely Fractured Over Climate Disruption 
America is a deeply divided nation on many cultural and economic 
issues, but climate disruption is an issue that divides us more than most.  And 
the division is both deep and wide.  Participants on both sides of the climate 
disruption debates have strongly held beliefs about the role of GHG 
emissions in causing climate disruption, the likely cost and availability of 
technologies for reducing or sequestering GHG emissions, whether 
government regulations or voluntary programs are more effective in reducing 
GHG emissions, and whether the United States should unilaterally take steps 
to address climate disruption before other major GHG-emitting nations take 
action.550  In many cases the gulf between the two sides is so wide that 
negotiation and compromise are virtually impossible.  A congressperson who 
believes that climate disruption is a fraud perpetrated by arrogant scientists 
on gullible liberals is unlikely to find common ground with a congressperson 
who believes that climate disruption is a real phenomenon, the effects of 
which we are currently witnessing in unprecedented hurricanes, typhoons, 
and droughts, and the causes of which are corporations that will always put 
the bottom line ahead of the public welfare. 
Science plays a role in these divisions.551  Despite the embarrassing 
East Anglia diversion, the scientific community has come to closure on the 
question of whether anthropogenic GHG emissions cause increased global 
temperatures.552  Nevertheless, a small, but determined group of scientists—
many of whom have derived financial support from energy companies—have 
provided a sufficient degree of doubt to persuade those who want to be 
persuaded that climate disruption is a theory that lacks a scientific basis.553 
Ideology also plays a significant role in the divisions.554  The 
business community’s idea infrastructure and its media echo chamber have 
been exceedingly effective in convincing a large segment of the population 
that government should not interfere in private economic arrangements.555  
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Many Americans are therefore ideologically predisposed to oppose 
government-based solutions to the threat of climate disruption.556  Even those 
who are convinced that climate disruption is real are not convinced that BTU 
taxes or cap-and-trade regimes are the way to go about addressing the 
problem.557  On the other side, environmental activists have historically been 
inclined ideologically to distrust corporations and to look to the government 
to solve environmental problems.558  This has changed somewhat in recent 
years with the acceptance by nearly all environmental groups of market-
based approaches to regulations that give companies flexibility to meet 
predetermined environmental goals in the most efficient way possible.559 
Finally, regional differences play a powerful role in these 
divisions.560  In part, these differences stem from the fact that some areas of 
the country are rich in coal, some are rich in natural gas, and some are poor 
in both resources.561  People from states in which coal plays a large role in 
the economy are not predisposed to favor programs that have the effect of 
discouraging coal use, just as people from natural gas-producing states are 
likely to favor such programs if the result is to induce power plants to switch 
from coal to natural gas.562  The differences may also reflect a subtler 
economic distinction reflecting the differing cost of electricity in different 
states.563  Economists John and Christopher Sautter have demonstrated that 
the distinction between Red States that vote mostly Republican and Blue 
States that vote mainly Democratic very closely tracks the cost of electricity 
in those states.564  The average cost of electricity in Red States is about 2.5¢ 
per kilowatt-hour lower than in Blue States.565  This suggests that people in 
Red States should be more inclined to oppose climate disruption legislation 
not just because it may harm local industries and increase unemployment, 
but also because it may increase the price they pay for electricity in the 
future.566  The business community’s influence infrastructure has proven 
very adept at appealing to these regional differences in advertising initiatives 
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and grassroots campaigns to generate opposition to climate disruption 
legislation.567 
As suggested by the Sautters’ study, these deep and wide divisions 
are now almost perfectly reflected in our two-party system.568  There was 
once a day when Republicans from the Northeast fought with Republicans 
from the Midwest over the content of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water 
Act.569  In the 1970s, some of the most vigorous proponents of environmental 
protection were Republicans like Senators Jacob Javits and John Chafee.570  
Although there are still vigorous Democratic supporters of the coal and 
electric utility industries in the South and Midwest, their numbers have 
diminished as the voters replaced them with Republicans.571  Now there are 
very few Republican politicians who are willing to advocate strong 
governmental intervention to solve environmental problems.  And they tend 
to vote with their fellow Republicans when it is their votes that really matter. 
D. The Business Community is Fractured on Climate Disruption, but 
the Fractures Are Neither Deep Nor Wide 
The business community has never been entirely of one mind in the 
debates over climate change.  In the early 1990s, the National Gas 
Association split with the rest of the business community in supporting a 
study concluding that GHG emissions could be reduced by moving rapidly to 
natural gas and other renewables.572  During the debates over the BTU tax, 
two small trade associationsboth of which had an economic interest in 
higher energy taxesbroke ranks and supported the Clinton 
Administration’s bill.573 
Fissures became more apparent in the 110th Congress.  A split 
developed between electric utility companies that were heavily dependent on 
coal and opposed cap-and-trade legislation, companies that were not so 
dependent on coal and supported cap-and-trade legislation with stringent 
caps and short deadlines, and still other companies that supported cap-and-
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trade legislation in principle, but opposed legislation that kicked in before the 
industry had time to develop CCS technology.574  This period also witnessed 
a major split in the business community over the reality of global warming as 
several Fortune 500 companies parted company with the CoC on climate 
disruption legislation.575  These fractures continued and deepened somewhat 
during the debates in the 111th Congress over the Waxman-Markey Bill in 
the House and the Kerry-Boxer and Kerry-Graham-Lieberman Bills in the 
Senate.576 
Upon close examination, however, it appears that these fractures are 
neither deep nor wide.  First, only relatively few companies have parted with 
the CoCthe nominal spokesperson for the business community.577  The 
breakaway companies are either manufacturers, like the Apple Corporation, 
that want to project a clean image, or natural gas distributors and public 
utilities that stand to gain economically from climate change legislation.578  
The most serious fractures within the energy industry have occurred over 
how the free allowances should be allocated among various segments of the 
industry.579  On the broader issue of free distribution of allowances versus 
auctions, the industry has been united in favoring free distribution.580 
Second, the idea and influence infrastructures have lives and minds 
of their own.  Although the think tanks, media outlets, and grassroots 
organizations depend heavily on the business community for financial 
support, they are driven by a strong ideological commitment to free markets 
and noninterventionist governmental policies.581  Because they also receive 
substantial support from conservative foundationsbillionaires like the 
Koch brothersand sympathetic individuals, the rift in the business 
community is not likely to affect them financially.582  It is therefore unlikely 
that they will change their positions on climate change legislation in the 
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foreseeable future, despite the rifts in the business community.583  
Consequently, it is unlikely that many Republican senators and 
representatives will change their tunes. 
Third, to the extent that the support indicated by some companies 
and trade associations for climate disruption legislation is strategic, the 
strong opposition to the same legislation by the CoC, as well as pro-business 
think tanks, grassroots organizations, and media outlets can be very useful.584  
There is an inside-the-beltway adage that “‘if you [are] not at the table, you 
[are] on the menu.’”585  Companies that would rather not see climate change 
legislation enacted may still want to play an influential role in shaping such 
legislation as it moves through Congress.  If they announce that they support 
reasonable legislation so long as it is fair to them, they can actively 
participate in the legislative deal-making, comfortable in the knowledge that 
the idea and influence infrastructures are carrying on the fight to prevent 
Congress from enacting that legislation. 
 A spokesperson for EEIwhich had opposed climate change during 
the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrationsacknowledged in August 
2009 that its position had evolved from opposing anything but a voluntary 
program to support for “‘well-designed legislation that will reduce GHG 
emissions while also containing costs to customers.’”586  Frank O’Donnell, 
the head of Clean Air Watch, suggested that the evolution did not represent a 
change in position so much as an acknowledgement that the politics of 
climate change had changed after the 2008 elections.587  Given the real 
possibility that a Democrat-controlled Congress would pass legislation that a 
Democratic president would sign, EEI may have decided that it should do 
what it could to influence the content of that legislation, even though it 
preferred no legislation at all.  The strong opposition to any legislation by the 
business community’s idea and influence infrastructures gave it an 
opportunity to have it both ways. 
At the end of the day, the divisions in the business community were 
not debilitating.  It presented a united front in opposition to any cap-and-
trade bill that allocated a significant proportion of the initial allowances 
through an auction, the tool preferred by most economists, and that lacked a 
bright-line safety valve that effectively removed the cap once the price of 
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allowances exceeded a prescribed level.588  Even on issues on which a few 
non-coal-dependent electric utility companies parted company with the EEI, 
the energy industry as a whole was capable of devoting considerable 
resources to stopping legislation they deemed undesirable.589  The ACCCE, 
an umbrella group for the electric utility and coal industry,590 spent almost 
$10 million on lobbyists in its short—but successful—campaign to defeat the 
Lieberman-Warner Bill.591  Fissures certainly developed in the industry most 
affected by climate change legislation, but they disappeared in the face of the 
kind of stringent legislation demanded by environmental groups. 
E. On the Question of Climate Disruption, Republicans Are Dogs, and 
Democrats Are Cats 
Time after time, the Republican leadership in Congress was able to 
persuade all but a tiny few members to vote as a pack against mandatory 
climate disruption legislation at both the committee level and on those rare 
occasions when bills came to the floors of the House and Senate.  The threat 
of a Republican filibuster in the Senate was so credible that the bills’ 
sponsors simply assumed that it would take sixty votes to pass them.592  For 
the Democratic leadership, by contrast, corralling enough votes to get bills 
through committees and past floor votes was like herding cats. 
In part, this reflects the geographical fact that few Republican 
members come from states that stand to benefit from climate change 
legislation beyond the benefits that accrue to all states from reduced climate 
disruption.593  But it also reflects a deep ideological commitment to a laissez 
faire minimalist approach to the role of government in society.  And this in 
turn reflects the influence of three decades worth of books, white papers, 
issue briefs, op-eds, and conferences undertaken by the conservative think 
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tanks and academic centers, and the business-oriented news and political 
commentary of the conservative media echo chamber. 
In every serious attempt to enact climate disruption legislation 
during the past two decades, Democratic members have divided along lines 
that reflected the economic interests of their states.594  In part, this is a 
manifestation of the fact that Democratic members come from more 
economically diverse regions.595  The fact that a large number of Democratic 
members hail from coal-producing states like West Virginia, Virginia, 
Illinois, and Pennsylvania, and manufacturing states like Ohio and Michigan, 
guarantees that critical issues, like the stringency of the caps and the 
allocation of allowances, will be divisive for Democrats.596  And the fact that 
many Democratic members represent rural agricultural states in the farm belt 
means that fractures are likely to occur on issues like the stringency of the 
caps—which arguably cause fuel and fertilizer prices to increase—and the 
entity that oversees trading in offsets.597 
 These divisions had three significant consequences.  First, they 
prevented the Democrats from voting as a block in favor of climate 
disruption legislation.598  Given the thinness of Democratic majorities in both 
houses in years in which they were in control, this made it extremely difficult 
to hit upon a formula that would secure the majority needed to pass 
legislation in the House and the supermajority needed to pass legislation over 
the opposition of a unified Republican Party in the Senate.599  Second, they 
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guaranteed that any bills that the Democrats were able to move through 
Congress would contain many exemptions and giveaways to industries 
favored by holdout members.600  Third, they ensured that the bill that 
Congress finally passed would probably not meet stringent intermediate 
environmental goals.601  Thus, one of the early concessions that 
Representative Waxman and Senators Kerry and Lieberman made to coal-
state members was a reduction in the 2020 cap from 20% below 2005 levels 
to 17%.602 
F. Public Interest Groups Are Outgunned and Outclassed 
The major environmental groups, like the Sierra Club, the 
Environmental Defense Fund, and the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
vigorously supported strong climate disruption legislation,603 and they 
benefitted from the fact that climate disruption legislation was high on the 
list of two Democratic presidents and Democratic leaders in both houses of 
Congress during the 107th and 111th Congresses.604  But they were clearly 
outgunned by the large agglomeration of industries that opposed their 
bills.605  Although the environmental organizations devoted unprecedented 
sums to lobbying, advertising, and grassroots campaigns, they were no match 
for the sophisticated efforts of the professional lobbyists and public relations 
operations of the CoC, the NAM, industry trade associations, and individual 
companies.606  Except for the Sierra Club, they had no equivalent of the 
highly organized grassroots campaigns of Citizens for a Sound Economy, 
Americans for Prosperity, and the many ad hoc organizations that industry 
created to fight particular battles.607  Perhaps more importantly, they had no 
                                            
600. See, e.g., Broder, Adding Something for Everyone, supra note 98. 
601. See Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, at 70. 
602. See Hart, House Energy, Climate Change Bill Cuts Carbon Emissions 
20% by 2020, supra note 274; Lizza, supra note 601. 
603. Ben Geman, Green Groups to Obama:  Choose Climate over Oil, NAT'L J. 
(Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/energy/green-groups-to-obama-choose-
climate-over-oil-20140117. 
604. See Geman, supra note 603; Clinton Plan: BTU’s Bearing the Brunt, 
supra note 58; Overview of Legislative Proposals in the 107th Congress, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & 
ENERGY SOLUTIONS, www.c2es.org/federal/congress/107 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); 111th 
Congress Climate Change Legislation, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, 
www.c2es.org/federal/congress/111 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
605. See Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate, 
supra note 397. 
606. See id. (relating lobbying expenses of industry and environmental groups 
for the first half of 2009). 
607. See Americans for Prosperity Calls Victorious Defeat of Bridge to 
Nowhere a Testament to the Power of Grassroots Activism, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sep. 21, 2007; 
76
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/3
2014] THE DISRUPTIVE POLITICS OF CLIMATE DISRUPTION 469 
equivalents of Fox News and Rush Limbaugh to spread their message 
throughout the country; although in the later years MSNBC and its 
commentators Rachel Maddow and Keith Olbermann began to fill that 
gap.608 
The campaign to enact climate disruption legislation in the 111th 
Congress was by far the most expensive campaign ever run by environmental 
groups.609  But even with tens of millions of dollars to spend on lobbying, 
advertising, and grassroots organizing, their efforts did not match the 
sophistication of the industry operations.610  The difference in approach is 
well illustrated by the grassroots tours that both the AEA and a coalition of 
environmental groups conducted during the critical August recess after the 
House had passed the Waxman-Markey Bill.611  People attending an AEA 
rally in Athens, Ohio enjoyed free lunches, live concerts, and free T-shirts, 
and heard stirring speeches filled with calls to action.612  People attending an 
environmental group rally in the same city soon thereafter got to hear a 
scholarly panel discuss the issues in a classroom and received free bumper 
stickers.613 
G. It Takes a Crisis 
In Freedom to Harm, I argue that “[r]egulatory legislation usually 
requires a crisis and a resulting groundswell of public opinion.”614  For 
example, the crisis brought on by the financial meltdown of September 2008 
motivated Congress to enact the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
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Consumer Protection Act of 2010.615  Climate disruption, by contrast, does 
not create the sort of extreme crises that lead Congress to enact legislation.616  
Thus, Senator James Inhofe scoffed at any suggestion that Congress should 
enact climate disruption legislation based “on speculative computer model 
predictions of [fifty] to [one hundred] years away of a looming climate 
catastrophe.”617  Environmental groups could try to attribute Superstorm 
Sandy, Supertyphoon Haiyan, or the sinking Polar Vortex of the winter of 
2013–14 to climate disruption.  Since few competent scientists are willing to 
support that claim, however, the groups have been hesitant to rely on such 
events to stir up public support for climate disruption legislation.618  Climate 
disruption comes gradually as glaciers melt, sea levels rise, periods of 
drought lengthen, and hurricanes worsen in intensity.619  Even in the absence 
of powerful idea and influence infrastructures aligned against legislation, it 
would have been very difficult for supporters of climate disruption 
legislation to persuade Congress to enact a stringent bill without the impetus 
of a crisis.  And climate disruption is not likely to yield such crises until it is 
far too late to do something about it. 
H. Climate Change Legislation Will Not Be Pretty 
One very clear lesson of the past attempts to enact climate disruption 
legislation is that the end result of any successful attempt in the future is not 
likely to be pretty.  Economists and policy analysts have created elegant 
models of carbon or BTU taxes and cap-and-trade regimes that appear to 
achieve GHG emissions reduction goals fairly and efficiently.620  Putting 
aside the question whether the models would work as fairly and efficiently in 
the real world, supporters of such solutions should understand that if 
Congress ever does enact climate disruption legislation, the regulatory 
regime that it creates will not adhere to the elegant models.  It will reflect 
dozens of compromises, concessions, and giveaways that its sponsors will 
have to make in order to get the legislation enacted.  As Representative 
Waxman observed after the House passed the Waxman-Markey Bill, 
“Congress has to recognize that there are differing opinions, there are 
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differing interests.”621  To accommodate all of these interests, the Bill’s 
sponsors will have to make compromises and look for ways to channel 
resources to particular regions of the country or to particular industries.622  
Outside observers of this process may not like it, but until this country comes 
up with a way to finance political campaigns in a way that does not heavily 
depend on contributions from wealthy individuals and corporations, this is 
the political world in which we live. 
I. EPA Should Press Ahead with its GHG Regulations 
The fact that the EPA was busily promulgating technology-based 
regulations for greenhouse gas emissions was an important driver of 
reluctant House Democrats to support the Waxman-Markey Bill in the 111th 
Congress.623  The in terrorem effect of the EPA’s regulatory program was 
not, however, an adequate inducement to Senate Democrats to finish the 
job.624  The EPA has now promulgated a series of regulations that, when 
fully implemented, will reduce emissions from major new facilities and 
modify existing facilities, and it has proposed a very ambitious new source 
performance standard for GHG emissions from power plants.625  We are still 
a very long way from the reductions that scientists tell us are necessary to 
slow down climate disruption.  But if the EPA had waited until Congress 
acted, we would not be as far down the road toward a reduced carbon 
footprint as we are. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If the Republican Party retains control of the House or gains control 
of the Senate in the 2014 elections, the probability that Congress will enact 
serious climate change legislation is very low.  That party is still heavily 
influenced by its Tea Party constituency and the Tea Party is financed by 
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funders who are strongly opposed to any governmental solution to global 
warming.  After two election cycles in which moderate Republicans have 
lost primary elections to Tea Party candidates626 and general elections to 
Democratic opponents,627 there are precious few Republican members of 
Congress who would support even very modest federal legislation on climate 
disruption.628  And there is no reason to suppose that this will change in the 
foreseeable future.  As long as it takes two houses of Congress to enact 
legislation, the adamant opposition of the Republican Party to climate 
disruption legislation will ensure that none will be forthcoming from a 
Congress in which at least one House is controlled by that party. 
Even if the Democratic Party retains control of the White House and 
the Senate and gains control of the House in 2014 or 2016, the prospects for 
enacting serious climate change legislation remain dim.  The myriad of 
interest groups that will be affected by serious climate change legislation will 
do whatever they can to influence legislators to oppose legislation that might 
damage their economic interests.  The legislators will, in turn, negotiate for 
their votes with those interests in mind.  If Congress does enact legislation, it 
is likely to be a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions that may or may not 
attain the larger GHG emission reduction goals of its sponsors.  The result 
will not be pretty, but it may be the best that we can expect in an 
economically diverse nation that, after a remarkable laissez faire revival, 
remains deeply divided on the fundamental question of the propriety of 
governmental intervention into private economic arrangements. 
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